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Better Regulation in Europe
Jonathan B Wiener*

Introduction
‘Better Regulation’ is sweeping Europe. Based on a White Paper on
Governance¹ and an expert group report,² both issued in 2001, the
European Commission under President Prodi adopted a suite of regulatory reform measures in 2002, including guidelines on impact assessment.³ Following a Communication from the new Barroso Commission
in March 2005,⁴ these guidelines were revised in 2005⁵ and updated
again in 2006.⁶ Impact Assessment (IA) is now required for all regulatory proposals on the Commission’s Work Programme. In addition, the
Commission is pressing for simplification of existing laws (through
* Perkins Professor of Law, and Professor of Enviromental Policy and Public Policy,
Duke University; University Fellow, Resources for the Future (RFF); Visiting Professor,
Paris, 2005–6. For support of this research, the author thanks the Eugene T. Bost, Jr
Research Professorship of the Charles A. Cannon Charitable Trust No 3 at Duke
University. For helpful comments and discussion, the author thanks Joanne Caddy, Luigi
Carbone, Cary Coglianese, Heidi Dawidoff, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, John Graham,
Olivier Godard, Robert Hahn, James Hammitt, Jane Holder, Stephane Jacobzone, Josef
Konvitz, Gert-Jan Koopmans, Andreas Kraemer, Ragnar Lofstedt, Giandomenico
Majone, Richard Macrory, Nikolai Malyshev, Patrick Messerlin, Lars Mitek Pederson,
Charles-Henri Montin, Shainila Pradhan, Ray Purdy, Cornelia Quennet-Thielen, Manuel
Santiago, Robert Scharrenbourg, Michel Setbon, Bernard Sinclair-Désgagné, Richard
Stewart, Cass Sunstein, Tim Swanson, Nicolas Treich, Matti Vainio, and participants
in meetings held at University College London, the OECD, the US-EU High-Level
Regulatory Cooperation Forum, and the French Ministry of Finance Economy &
Industry.
¹ European Commission, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’, COM(2001) 428.
² Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report, November 2001.
³ European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Impact
Assessment, COM(2002) 276, 5 June 2002 (hereafter ‘IA Guidelines 2002’).
⁴ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament, ‘Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union’,
COM(2005) 97, SEC(2005) 175, 16 March 2005.
⁵ European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2005) 791, 15 June
2005 (hereafter ‘IA Guidelines 2005’).
⁶ European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2005) 791, 15 June
2005, with 15 March 2006 update (hereafter ‘IA Guidelines 2006’).
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consolidation, codification, and repeal), reduction of administrative costs
(‘cutting red tape’), and consultation with those affected by regulatory
policies.
The member states of the European Union (EU) are likewise adopting programs of Better Regulation, some predating and spurring the
Commission’s efforts, and others in turn spurred by the Commission.⁷ In
2004, a coalition of four of the rotating six-month Presidencies of
the European Union (Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Britain)
issued a joint statement of their intention to pursue Better Regulation
efforts during their upcoming Presidencies; this letter played an important role in spurring the European Commission to update and strengthen
its IA Guidelines.⁸ To note one prominent example of action by a member state, the UK has launched a Better Regulation Executive⁹ and an
external advisory Better Regulation Commission. In May 2005, UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a speech on ‘Risk and the State’,
emphasizing that risk regulation is absolutely necessary, but criticizing
overregulation of small risks in the futile effort to reduce risks to zero
(often as an overreaction to a recent crisis), thus impeding innovation
and inducing perverse effects that ‘do more damage than was done by
the problem itself ’. As a remedy, he advocated the program of ‘Better
Regulation’ based on a ‘rigorous risk-based approach’ that will employ
impact assessments and ‘regulate only after reflection’.¹⁰
Will Better Regulation make a difference? Will it make things better?
This study begins by examining the Better Regulation initiative as an
exercise of legal borrowing, and by framing the question whether Better
Regulation will really yield better results. After several transatlantic
conflicts over regulatory topics such as the precautionary principle, genetically modified foods, and climate change, Europe and America now
appear to be converging on the analytic basis for regulation. In a process of
hybridization, European institutions are borrowing ‘Better Regulation’
reforms from both the US approach to regulatory review using benefit-cost
analysis and from European member states’ initiatives on administrative
⁷ The Communication of 16 March 2005, COM(2005) 97, above, included a colourful chart of relative progress on Better Regulation among the member states. Highest
marks went to Denmark, the UK, and Poland; lowest marks went to France, Portugal, and
Cyprus. See below in the section on European Experience at n 88.
⁸ See Joint Initiative on Regulatory Reform, a Letter from the EU Presidencies of Ireland,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the UK, 26 January 2004, at http://www.finance.gov.ie/
documents/pressreleases/2004/janmcc12462. pdf.
⁹ See http://www.betterregulation.gov.uk/ and  http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
regulation/.
¹⁰ Prime Minister Tony Blair, ‘Speech on Risk and the State’, 26 May 2005, available at
 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7562.asp.
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costs and simplification; in turn the European Commission is helping to
spread these reforms among the member states.
In the following sections, this study addresses in more detail the main
components of Better Regulation—impact assessments and administrative simplification—and advocates the adoption of several institutional
improvements. (Other aspects of regulatory reform in Europe, such as
transparency, consultation, and subsidiarity, are mentioned here but are
not the focus.) In many respects, the Better Regulation initiative promises
salutary reforms, such as wider use of regulatory impact assessments and a
reduction in unnecessary bureaucracy. In other respects, the European
initiative speaks more of Procrustean deregulation than of better regulation. Meanwhile the European Commission still needs to establish the
institutional infrastructure needed to succeed. I argue that the European
program of Better Regulation is well-founded but could be even better if it
adopted several strategies: enlarging the scope of impact assessment and
benefit-cost analysis toward a broader, ‘warmer’, and more evenhanded
application of these tools, with greater attention to multiple risks; moving
beyond a narrow focus on cutting administrative costs or simplification for
their own sake, toward criteria that address benefits as well as costs; centralizing expert oversight so that impact assessments actually influence
decisions, both to say ‘no’ to bad ideas and ‘yes’ to good ideas; and undertaking ex post evaluation of policies for adaptive policy revision and for
improvement of ex ante assessment methods. These reforms would help
Better Regulation achieve its true objective: better, not just less or more. In
turn, the US could study these European innovations and borrow from
them where they prove successful.

Legal Borrowing
The Better Regulation initiative is a conscious exercise of legal borrowing.
This borrowing has been both horizontal and vertical. Horizontal legal
borrowing occurs when one co-equal legal system borrows from another,
such as Europe borrowing from the US, or one European member state
from another EU member state.¹¹ Vertical legal borrowing occurs when a
supra-governmental regime borrows from its own constituent members,
such as the EU-level institutions borrowing from EU member states.¹²
¹¹ The literature on horizontal legal borrowing (across states) is extensive; the classic is
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn) (Athens, Ga:
University of Georgia Press, 1993).
¹² A framework of legal borrowing that adds the vertical dimension (between states
and federal and international bodies) is developed in Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Something
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The Better Regulation initiative in Europe borrows along both of these
dimensions. It is an outgrowth of ideas percolating up from (vertically)
and spreading across (horizontally) the EU member states; of the integration of EU institutions and the current EU platform of competitiveness,
good governance, and sustainable development;¹³ and also of deliberate
(horizontal) borrowing from American law. It is thus a perfect example of
legal ‘hybridization’, an evolutionary process involving the exchange and
recombination of traits (here, legal ideas) from different species (here,
legal systems) into new hybrid versions in response to changing needs.¹⁴
As in biological evolution, legal hybrids do not always succeed. Mixing
together legal concepts can be ineffective or incoherent.¹⁵ As in biology,
legal hybrids succeed when they possess novel combinations of traits that
enable them to occupy new niches opened up by changing external
demands. Better Regulation in Europe is a hybrid package of reforms
attempting to respond to changing needs for regulatory management.
In its Impact Assessment Guidelines, the Commission tellingly quotes
US President Woodrow Wilson: ‘I not only use all the brains that I have,
but all that I can borrow’.¹⁶ The Commission’s immediate point here is to
espouse borrowing ideas from public input and interservice consultation
to improve regulation, but the quotation simultaneously invokes the
larger project of legal borrowing involved in the European initiative on
Better Regulation, which emulates key concepts and tools of regulatory
reform developed in the American administrative state over the past
four decades.¹⁷
Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants in the Evolution of Global
Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 Ecology LQ 1295.
¹³ A useful history of the connections of Better Regulation to these three elements of
the EU platform is provided in Ragnar Lofstedt, ‘The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum
in Europe: From Precautionary Principle to (Regulatory) Impact Analysis’ (2004) 28 J Risk
& Uncert 237–60.
¹⁴ For further discussion on ‘hybridization’ of legal ideas and the counterpart concepts
in evolutionary biology, see Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Whose Precaution After All? A Comment
on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems’ (2003) 13 Duke J
Comparative & Int’l Law 207, 254–61. An overview of evolutionary biology concepts
applied to legal evolution is Simon Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal
Memetics’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 1–42. See also sources cited in nn 29–31
below on legal borrowing and diffusion.
¹⁵ See Wiener, n 14 above (noting failure of hybrids until new niches open); Willam
Reppy, ‘Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?’ (1983) 34 Mercer L
Rev 645 (criticizing eclecticism as unpredictable and standardless, while endorsing careful
construction and transparent selection of new hybrid methods). Moreover, diffusion
itself can sometimes undermine incentives to innovate or can invite fads. See David Lazer,
‘Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order’, (March 2005) Annals of the American
Academy 52–66.
¹⁶ Quoted in IA Guidelines 2006, at 9.
¹⁷ On the US history, see Richard Pildes and Cass R Sunstein, ‘Reinventing the
Regulatory State’ (1995) 32 U Chicago L Rev 1; Elena Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’
(2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2246.
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What is now emerging is a global movement toward regulatory reform
and Better Regulation, drawing significantly on American administrative
law and oversight mechanisms.¹⁸ The American sources of European
Better Regulation are well recognized. For example, the head of Irish government recently observed:
Better Regulation and EU-US perspectives are foremost in my mind these days.
Better Regulation is a core theme of our EU Presidency and featured prominently
at the recent Spring Economic Council . . . . There is a long tradition in American
Public Administration of focussing on the quality and impact of regulation.
Many of the policies, institutions and tools that support Better Regulation have
their origins in the USA. For example, a lot of very significant anti-trust and
consumer protection measures were put in place in the USA in the first decades
of the 20th century. There is much that we have learned from the United States
in relation to regulatory management and, through occasions like this, much that
we can continue to learn . . . . We hope too that there will be shared learning.
While we in the European Union are newer to the game, I hope that we have
moved beyond our rookie season! The Union is making up ground quickly in
respect of Better Regulation. This is as it should be. There is a deeper understanding within the European Institutions and Member States of the need for
regulatory reform.¹⁹

This process is not one-way: American legal ideas are not the only ones
being adopted in other countries. At the same time that the Better
Regulation initiative is bringing the methods of impact assessment and
regulatory review from the US to Europe, other legal concepts are also
spreading from Europe and elsewhere to the US and beyond.²⁰ The
precautionary principle is perhaps the best example of a European
regulatory law export (adopted, for example, in US statutes and judicial
decisions in the 1970s and by the city of San Francisco in 2003);
¹⁸ See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law’, (summer/autumn 2005) 68 L & Contemp Probs 15; Richard
B Stewart, ‘Accountability and the Discontents of Globalization: US and EU Models for
Regulatory Governance’ (draft 2006); Robert W Hahn and Robert E Litan, ‘Counting
Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the US and Europe’ (2005) 8 J Int’l Econ Law
473–508; Robert W Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective (Washington,
DC: AEI Press, 2001).
¹⁹ Speech by the Taoiseach (head of government of Ireland), Mr Bertie Ahern, TD, at
the IBEC Conference on EU-US Perspectives on Regulation, Dublin, 19 April 2004,
available at http://www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp?docID57.
²⁰ This mixed and multi-directional pattern stands in contrast to the claim that the
globalization of law is a one-way process of imperious Americanization, eg Ugo Mattei,
‘A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US Hegemony and the Latin Resistance’ (2003) 10
Indiana J Global Legal Studies 383. Contrary to Mattei, European legal ideas are also being
borrowed, including by America. And (as Mattei also recognizes) America is frequently a
borrower of other countries’ immigrants and ideas, so even the export of nominally
‘American’ legal ideas is often the reception, recombination, and re-export of others’ ideas.

452

Jonathan B Wiener

environmental contracts or covenants are another. The larger picture of
globalization is one of shared hybridization across legal systems, that is,
the mutual borrowing of many legal ideas across many countries and the
creation of new hybrid legal concepts.²¹ The Better Regulation initiative
is itself a hybrid, combining the American tool of regulatory impact
assessment (RIA) with European strands such as simplification and a
standardized approach to measuring administrative costs.
Moreover, Better Regulation is not just an American idea. Considered as
a form of structured reasoning to inform sound public policy and bureaucratic governance, as I describe below (recalling Benjamin Franklin’s ‘prudential algebra’), it is also a European idea: one need only think of Bentham,
Hume, Smith, and Mill, and of Montaigne, Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire,
and Max Weber, to name a few. America did not invent the ideas of forecasting future risks, reasoned decision-making, and rigorously assessing
public policy options, even if the US government has by now constructed a
highly developed system for implementing these concepts. In recent years,
British, Australian, and Italian scholars have made important contributions
to Better Regulation.²² And French scholars, across the political spectrum,
have championed evidence-based reasoning for government policy; they
include figures as diverse as Bertrand de Jouvenel²³ and Pierre Bourdieu.²⁴
²¹ On the spread of the precautionary principle and hybridization across legal systems,
see Wiener, n 14 above.
²² Eg N Gunningham and P Grabosky, Smarter Regulation: Designing Environmental
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and
Robert Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001); Richard Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a
Post-Hampton World’ (The Macrory Review of Penalties) (consultation document,
March 2006); Claudio Radaelli, What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe?
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 05–02, January
2005; Andrea Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU (Brussels: CEPS, 2006); Giandomenico
Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996).
²³ Bertrand de Jouvenel, L’Art de la Conjecture (Monaco: Editions du Rocher, 1964).
This call for rigorous thinking about the future influenced Herman Kahn and Anthony
J Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation (New York: Macmillan, 1967), which
helped bring scenario-based forecasting and decision-making to the US government.
²⁴ Bourdieu is cited by Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London:
Penguin, 2002), p x for the point that politicians need to engage in scientific debate based
on facts and evidence before adopting public policies. Bourdieu was a leading French sociologist, 1930–2002, at L’ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en sciences sociales (EHESS) and then
at the Collège de France, a theorist of social fields and social capital, a leftist activist, and an
opponent of liberal markets and globalization; he was the author of Acts of Resistance:
Against the Tyranny of the Market (New York: New Press, 1999) and ‘Utopia of Endless
Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberalism’ Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1998, at
http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu (denouncing market liberalism promoted by economists, and favoring public interest based on collective institutions and
empirical verification of theory); he was also the subject of the documentary film La
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It is worth noting that US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, in his
book on what is now called Better Regulation, held up the French Conseil
d’Etat as a model to transplant to the US.²⁵ And it was a French expert,
Dieudonné Mandelkern, who led the multinational group whose report
proposed the EU Better Regulation initiative in 2001.²⁶
Legal borrowing of the concepts and nomenclature of ‘better regulation’ and ‘regulatory impact assessment’ does not necessarily mean convergence in the content of policies and procedures adopted to implement
those ideas. As Claudio Radaelli has emphasized, the ‘diffusion of a common RIA “bottle”’ does not necessarily produce the same ‘wine’.²⁷
Nonetheless, it is striking that European regulatory policy is now
expressly borrowing ideas from American law, even when transatlantic
relations are relatively strained. It is even more striking that chief among
these borrowed ideas is impact assessment as a check on regulation, or
more precisely as a way to shape regulation. The contrast to the debate
over the precautionary principle in the 1990s is stark: there Europe
sought to export its aggressive platform over the objections of a reluctant
US government, and to position Europe (at least rhetorically) as a distinct
pro-environment alternative to American pro-market regulatory policy
in the post-Cold War era.²⁸
Sociologie est un Sport de Combat (2003). Said Bourdieu: ‘Observation of reality puts us on
our guard against the temptation to construct over-simple models’ (from Bourdieu’s
work on the peasantry in Béarn; quoted in Douglas Johnson, ‘ Obituary: Pierre Bourdieu’
the Guardian 28 January 2002, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/
0,,640396,00.html).
²⁵ Stephen G Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), part III.
²⁶ Mandelkern Group Report, n 2 above.
²⁷ Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Diffusion without Convergence: How Political Context
Shapes the Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment’, (October 2005) 12 Journal of
European Public Policy 924–43.
²⁸ See Wiener, n 14 above (reporting the evolution of precaution in EU and US legal
systems, and the claim that the EU had become more precautionary than the US by the
1990s). Studies in the 1980s typically found that the US used scientific and economic
analysis more than did Europe, although the ultimate standards set were similar. Eg Sheila
Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage, 1986); David
Vogel, National Styles of Regulatin: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United
States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). Whether Europe actually adopted a
more precautionary regulatory system than the US in the 1990s is, however, open to question. Several cases support that claim, including greater European precaution on hormones
in beef, genetically modified foods, climate change, and toxic chemicals. On the other
hand, several cases point the other way, including greater US precaution on mad cow disease (BSE) and vCJD in blood, particulate matter emissions from power plants and diesel
vehicles, youth violence, and terrorism, see Wiener, n 14 above. But these cases are not a
representative sample from which reliable generalizations can be drawn about trends in all
risk regulation. We therefore studied a data set of all of the 2,878 risks identified in the US
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What explains this rapprochement? First, it illustrates the view that
legal borrowing is ubiquitous, occurring all the time in multiple directions.²⁹ Legal borrowing has played a strong role in the evolution and
diffusion of environmental regulation in the past.³⁰ Borrowing has
helped spread such legal concepts as environmental impact assessment,
pollution discharge information disclosure registries, economic incentive instruments including emissions trading, and precaution. Scholars
often write about these patterns of diffusion after they have occurred.
Sometimes scholars also play a role in the process of transplantation as it
occurs;³¹ Better Regulation is one of those cases, as experts share ideas
across the Atlantic through papers, conferences, and sabbaticals. A central point here is that the current borrowing of Better Regulation tools
has not been much constrained by abstract ideological or rhetorical
commitments, nor by supposed national styles or mentalities of law.³²
and Europe over 1970–2004; we found no significant trend toward greater European precaution over the period. James K Hammitt, Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, Denise
Hall, and Zheng Zhou, ‘Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States: A
Quantitative Comparison’ (October 2005) 25 Risk Analysis 1215–28.
²⁹ See Watson, n 11 above, 22; cf Jack L Walker. ‘The Diffusion of Innovation Among
the American States’ (1969) 63 Am Poli Sci Rev 880–9 (within the US); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) (across
international networks). There are parallel literatures on the diffusion of business and technological innovations, see Everett M Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (5th edn) (New York:
Free Press, 2003) (first pub 1963); on the diffusion of social innovations, see eg Torsten
Hägerstrand, ‘The Diffusion of Innovations’ (1968) 4 International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences 194; A J Toynbee, (1961) 12 ‘A Study of History: Reconsiderations’ 343
(describing as ‘mimesis’ the process of cross-cultural diffusion); and on the diffusion of
political systems, see eg Kurt Weyland, ‘Theories of Policy Diffusion’, (2005) 57 World
Politics 262–95; Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, ‘On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion:
A Conceptual Framework’ (2004) Annals of the American Academy (AAPSS); Beth
Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, ‘The International Diffusion of
Liberalism’, (Fall 2006) International Organization.
³⁰ See Peter H, Sand, Transnational Environmental Law: Lessons in Global Change (The
Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 241; Wiener, n 12 above; Per-olof
Busch and Helge Jörgens, ‘The International Sources of Policy Convergence: Explaining
the Spread of Environmental Policy Innovations’ (October 2005) 12 Journal of European
Public Policy 860–84.
³¹ Watson argues that much borrowing is carried out by elite jurists who borrow what
they happen to know or come across in their travels, communications, and research (n 14
above, at 112–13). In a similar way, Peter Galison writes about the exchange of ideas across
scientific disciplines occurring when experts participate in a ‘trading zone’ such as by collaborating on a common research tool. Peter Galison, Image & Logic: A Material Culture of
Microphysics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).
³² For the view that national styles or mentalities of law are highly influential, see Vogel,
n 28 above; K Zweigert and H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, T Weir
trans) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) (styles of legal systems are seen in their history, their ‘predominant and characteristic mode of thought’, their institutions, and their
ideology, ibid 68); Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are Not Converging’ (1996)
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Contrasts between allegedly US and European approaches to law and
regulation are overstated,³³ as intergroup contrasts often are.³⁴ Instead,
the ongoing Better Regulation experience suggests that legal borrowing
can readily occur across ostensibly different legal systems, as change
agents of legal evolution (such as scholars or policy entrepreneurs within
government) import legal concepts and as those legal concepts offer net
benefits to the receiving society or its institutions.³⁵
Second, economic and political globalization are increasing the opportunities for exchange of legal ideas. Trade, transnational and transgovernmental networks, epistemic communities of experts, and telecommunications
(especially the internet) have made it more likely, even in just the last fifteen years, that legal concepts used in one country can be researched and
cross-fertilized in another country. Even if national legal styles or mentalities governed in the past, increasing exchange across legal systems is
leading those old ways to evolve toward more open, cosmopolitan
attitudes, and a process of ‘hybridization’ in which mixtures of legal ideas
create new hybrid modes that populate both sources.³⁶
Third, ‘it’s the economy’. A major objective of Better Regulation is
economic competitiveness.³⁷ The US adopted regulatory reform efforts
in the 1970s and 1980s in part to combat inflation and recession. Europe
turned to Better Regulation in the last five years to remedy its sluggish
economy, which has been growing at about 2 percent per year of late, in
contrast to roughly 3 to 4 percent per year in the US and nearly 10 percent
per year in China. The Lisbon Strategy adopted in 2000 aims to make
45 ICLQ 52 (emphasizing distinctive national legal mentalities); Robert A Kagan, Adversarial
Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001). But
see John Bell, French Legal Cultures (London: Cambridge University Press/Butterworths,
2001) (finding different legal cultures in the different institutions within France).
³³ Some have argued that Europe now follows the Precautionary Principle whereas the
US does not, eg David Vogel, ‘The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of
Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe’, (2003) 33 British J Poli Sci 557–80,
but our research finds little evidence of such a divergence. See Wiener, n 14 above (reviewing
the debate); Hammitt et al, n 28 above (surveying a large array of risks and finding little or
no trend toward greater European precaution).
³⁴ Cf Henri Tajfel, ‘Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’ (1970) 223 Scientific
American 96–102 (showing that people tend to exaggerate intergroup differences); Amartya
Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: WW Norton, 2006) (showing
that group characterizations are misleading because they ignore enormous variation
among individuals).
³⁵ For a model of legal borrowing supplied by change agents and potentially subject to
benefit-cost analyses in the receiving jurisdiction (depending on the voting rules for adoption of law in the receiving institutions), see Wiener, n 12 above, at 1344–62.
³⁶ On hybridization of regulatory law, see Wiener, n 14 above, at 254–61.
³⁷ Better Regulation builds on the continuing program of regulatory reform of
economic regulation—reform or deregulation of price controls, subsidies, and limits on
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Europe the most productive economy in the world by 2010, while
maintaining the European social model and fostering environmentally
sustainable growth. The Better Regulation initiative is explicitly tied to
the Lisbon Strategy. The Prodi Commission stressed good governance;
the Barroso Commission stresses competitiveness.³⁸ Slow economic growth
and high unemployment in Europe prompted the Lisbon Strategy to
boost growth and jobs; the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ reports added
pressure on European governments to attract business via legal reform.³⁹
The four Presidencies’ letter of January 2004 began with this opening
paragraph:
The European Commission’s recent review of the European economy pointed
out that regulatory reform is a key element in seeking to achieve the goals of the
Lisbon strategy. The IMF has made it clear that improvements in the EU regulatory framework could deliver as much as a 7 per cent increase in GDP and a 3 per
cent increase in productivity in the longer term.⁴⁰

It almost goes without saying that one key purpose of regulatory reform
is to reduce costs.⁴¹ In the 1980s the US had a Task Force on Regulatory
Relief, later called the Competitiveness Council; the EU now has a
Competitiveness Council of Commissioners. The UK Better Regulation
Executive was earlier called the Regulatory Impact Unit, and before that
the Deregulation Unit in the 1990s. Reducing the costs of regulation
is driven by both internal and external pressures. Because regulation
market access in regulated industries such as aviation, trucking, and banking. Despite the
predictions of public choice theory that reform of economic regulation was unlikely to
occur (because such regulation benefits concentrated industry interests who would lobby
to maintain it), much reform and deregulation have in fact occurred. On the US experience focusing on telecommunications, see Robert Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); on the experience in the UK and Japan, see
Steven Kent Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial
Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
³⁸ In the Communication of 16 March 2005, COM(2005) 97, SEC(2005) 175,
‘Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union’, the first objective identified is ‘competitiveness’, ibid 3.
³⁹ See n 176 below.
⁴⁰ See Joint Initiative on Regulatory Reform, n 8 above, at 1, citing European
Commission, ‘The EU Economy: 2003 Review’, COM(2003) 729, and IMF, ‘When
Leaner isn’t Meaner: Measuring Benefits and Spillovers of Greater Competition in Europe’
2003.
⁴¹ Much of the debate addresses its efficacy in reducing costs. See Robert Baldwin,
‘Is Better Regulation Better for Business?’ (2004), at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
pressAndInformationOffice/newsAndEvents/archives/2004/Is_BetterRegulation_
betterForBusiness.htm (criticizing inadequate regulatory relief meant to help industry); Corporate Environment Observer, ‘Better Regulation: For Whom ?’ (2004), at
http://www.corporateeurope.org/observer9/regulation.html (criticizing regulatory
relief undertaken at industry’s behest).
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imposes costs on the domestic economy, there is internal pressure for
reform. Because some regulation favors domestic producers over foreign
producers, yielding international trade disputes, there is external pressure
for reform. (Meanwhile, of course, regulations also may have benefits,
such as health and environmental protection, which could be lost if regulations were rescinded or diluted.)
Corroborating this point is the remarkable fact that Europe has also
borrowed the regulatory tool of emissions trading from the US in order to
implement the Kyoto Protocol. During the 1990s, European negotiators
resisted and criticized US proposals for greenhouse gas emissions trading.
Now, even while criticizing the US for its reluctance to join the Kyoto
Protocol, Europe has adopted the very policy proposal that the US had
been urging as the flagship instrument to achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions.⁴² The basic reason is no mystery: cost-effectiveness.
When Europe ratified Kyoto and finally got down to implementing its
targets, it became clear that emissions trading would be a cost-saving,
highly effective method of reducing emissions.⁴³ Cost drove legal borrowing of emissions trading, despite a previously strong rhetorical opposition to this very legal tool and to its source—a rhetoric that one no longer
hears in Europe.
Fourth, a related but somewhat different motivation for regulatory
reform is to enable the Executive (the President, Prime Minister, or other
head of government) to respond to the growth of the regulatory state. The
Executive is held accountable by the public for both the costs of regulation (hence pressure to reduce regulation or its costliness), and for the
harms of risks not prevented (hence pressure to regulate effectively). In
the US, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 followed the New Deal
expansion of administrative regulation, and Presidential Executive
Orders on regulatory review in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s followed the
⁴² See Wiener, n 12 above; Joseph Kruger and William Pizer, ‘Greenhouse Gas Trading
in Europe’ ( October 2004) Environment magazine, 8–23.
⁴³ One current concern is that states may distort the operation of the CO₂ allowance
market, partly by allocating excess allowances to shield their industries, arguably leading to
price volatility in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the spring of 2006 when this
allocation pattern became apparent (and the market price dropped from 30 to 9 euros in one
week). On the general problem, see Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ (1999) 108 Yale LJ 677–800 , at Part V (warning that
nation-states may interfere or ‘meddle’ with the operation of international allowance trading markets). Carol Rose observed that such ‘meddling’ is not always ‘frivolous’, because
states may be protecting against local hotspots, see Carol Rose, ‘Expanding The Choices for
the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to OldFashioned Common Property Regimes’, 10 Duke Envtl L & Pol’y F 45, 61 and n 69 (2000).
But in CO2 markets there are no serious hotspot concerns to justify state interference.
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Great Society adoption of major health and environmental legislation.
The President was compelled to deal with Congressional enactment of
regulatory statutes (often delegating substantial power and discretion to
regulatory agencies, and foisting on agencies the hard choices of reconciling competing objectives such as health versus cost); and to respond to
judicial review of agency action (which is non-expert and not politically
accountable, and may distort or ossify regulatory policy). Likewise in
Europe, the Better Regulation initiative follows the increasing integration
of EU institutions and the greater competency of the EU to regulate
health and the environment after the Single European Act and the
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice treaties. Better Regulation is in part a
move to find a common basis for regulation among the EU institutions
(in particular the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council) and the
member states, facilitating trade in the Single European Market and
ensuring political accountability of government policy.⁴⁴ And Better
Regulation responds to the need to re-establish the credibility and legitimacy of effective regulation in Europe after a series of public health crises
such as mad cow disease (BSE), foot and mouth disease, and scares over
dioxin in animal feed, benzene in Perrier, and genetically modified foods.
In short, Better Regulation recognizes the need for sound management of
the regulatory state, on both sides of the Atlantic.

Is Better Regulation Better?
Given that the EU is borrowing regulatory reform from the US, a normative evaluation of this exercise is in order. It would perhaps be typical
for an American legal expert to espouse this flattering imitation, saying,
yes, do as we have done, copy our system. But here I write to say: do as we
have learned, not simply as we have done. Europe should not simply
borrow directly from the US. Europe should innovate, not imitate.
Moreover, regulatory reform in Europe must be adapted to suit European
institutions. Through this process, Europe should experiment with institutional innovations that can make Better Regulation even better. Europe
has an opportunity to do a better job at Better Regulation than the US has
⁴⁴ This is true even though the EU does not have the same type of executive branch as
the US, headed by a President popularly elected for a term of four years. The EU has a college of Commissioners, appointed as a slate for a term of five years; the President of the
Commission is its leader but is also a somewhat equal colleague and is not popularly
elected. And the EU as a whole has a Presidency held in rotation by each member state for
six months at a time. In these respects, the EU Executive function is weaker or more decentralized than the US Presidency. At the same time, the European Commission has a
monopoly on the initiation of legislation, a power that the US President lacks.
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done, or, at least, to try out new approaches that can be compared to the
US system. If Europe demonstrates improvements in regulatory policy,
those advances can and should be borrowed back by the US. Further,
the adoption of Better Regulation in Europe can itself create a common
language and platform for greater transatlantic communication and
collaboration about regulatory policy.⁴⁵
A key theme of this article is that where there are problems in regulatory reform and Better Regulation, such as the debate over benefit-cost
analysis (BCA), there are valuable institutional remedies. Where there are
controversies regarding the limitations or biases in analytic methods, the
underlying sources of these problems are often institutional, not analytic,
and can often be ameliorated by institutional reorientations. Thus
Europe, and in turn the US, can make Better Regulation even better by
investing in intelligent institutional structures and approaches.
‘Better regulation’ clearly expresses a more sympathetic view of regulation than does ‘deregulation’, or cost-cutting for greater competitiveness,
or even than ‘regulatory reform’. ‘Reform’ could imply improvement, but
also pruning and paring, whereas ‘better’ casts a brighter light on creative
approaches.⁴⁶ Critics of regulatory reform fear that it really means less regulation, that is, less protection, not better. Of course, cost reduction
is desirable, as long as benefits are not reduced even more. European
legal systems may need cost reduction and increased flexibility, for example in labor law. But ‘better’ regulation puts the focus on better results,
⁴⁵ One example is the series of US–High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum meetings now being held (the latest in January and May 2006).
⁴⁶ The Irish government defines ‘Regulatory reform’ as ‘ “changes that improve regulatory quality i.e. enhance the performance, cost-effectiveness or legal quality of regulations and related government formalities” [quoting OECD, Regulatory Reform in Ireland
(2001), at 17]. . . . Examples of changes to the process of regulation include: impact analysis/assessment techniques; the use of alternatives to traditional regulation such as market
mechanisms and economic incentives and “sunsetting” arrangements whereby regulations
are formally reviewed at a future date to establish whether or not they are still valid or if they
could be improved, reduced or even revoked’. By contrast, ‘ “ Regulatory management,
Better Regulation and Smarter Regulation” are the terms which are increasingly being used
to convey the concept of an ongoing commitment to improving the processes of policy formulation, legislative drafting and enhancing the overall effectiveness and coherence of regulation. The idea of “Better Regulation” also helps to draw an important distinction
between the wide reform agenda and deregulation. It is accepted that in some cases consumer, investor and the broader public interest may be better served by introducing new
regulation and that in other cases it may be better served by removing regulation. No initial assumption is being made about either the existing quality or quantity of regulation or
the need to deregulate. Instead, it is suggested that the goal of Better Regulation will not be
achieved by simply seeking to minimise the volume of regulation but rather by using as
simple and straightforward measures as possible to achieve policy objectives’. See
http://www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp?locID20&docID-1.
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outcomes, performance—not just on less regulation per se (nor more). The
European initiative on Better Regulation has not gone into detail about
what it means by ‘better’ results, apart from emphasizing accountability
and competitiveness. At a first approximation, better results should mean
improving societal well-being, that is, increasing societal net benefits, via
less cost or more protection or, ideally, both.⁴⁷ ‘Better’ could in some cases
imply ‘less’, but that depends on the calculus of better outcomes, not on a
pre-analytic commitment to less regulation for its own sake. And sometimes ‘less is more’,⁴⁸ in the sense that better results can be achieved by
more streamlined and lower-cost approaches, but again this is ‘less’ as a
route to ‘better’ rather than less for its own sake. (Meanwhile, one can also
question whether a much-touted program of Better Regulation is really
making a difference, or whether it is just rhetoric and symbolic politics.
Answering this question requires assessing the quality of impact assessments, the staff and resources being brought to bear, the structures and
rules being adopted, and the actual influence on regulatory decisions. I
discuss these issues further in the sections on Impact Assessment and
Oversight below.)
The Better Regulation initiative could indeed yield better results. The
use of impact assessment has the potential to improve regulatory policies
and outcomes, increasing net benefits. Administrative cost reduction and
simplification can reduce regulatory burdens and untangle needless
bureaucratic rigidity. And the Better Regulation initiative, especially the
use of IA, is moderating the earlier fervor for the precautionary principle;⁴⁹ indeed the European Commission has redefined the precautionary principle as requiring benefit-cost analysis.⁵⁰ Precaution can be
worth-while to prevent uncertain and potentially irreversible risks, but it
can also be excessive, incurring the costs of false positives, innovation foregone, and new countervailing risks (themselves uncertain and potentially
⁴⁷ This is plainly a first approximation. There is not space here to compare alternative
conceptions of welfare, efficiency, Bentham, Kaldor-Hicks, Pareto, fairness, and other formulations. Suffice to say here that competitiveness is only one element of the overall social
well-being that ‘better’ should entail; and that the European stewards of Better Regulation
should develop a more thorough explanation of what they mean by ‘better’. See below on
‘warm analysis’.
⁴⁸ See UK Better Regulation Task Force report, Regulation: Less is More (March 2005).
⁴⁹ See Wiener, n 14 above, at 220–25; Lofstedt, n 13 above.
⁵⁰ See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 1, Brussels, 2 February 2000 (available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf) (providing that
precautionary regulation must satisfy proportionality and must be based on an analysis of
benefits and costs).
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irreversible).⁵¹ Yet if the Better Regulation initiative focuses exclusively
on competitiveness, that is, on reducing costs to industry, without considering social and environmental benefits, it risks yielding less regulation
instead of better results. Moreover, increasing net benefits expands the
social surplus that can be distributed to engage allies. To succeed and
endure, the Better Regulation initiative needs to increase the net benefits
of regulation.
In my experience, both in government and in academia, there is a huge
swath of interests who favor less regulation regardless of its benefits, and a
huge swath who favor more regulation regardless of its costs. In both
cases, the alternative to analysis is sanctimony—supposing one knows the
right answer without analyzing the consequences. In between these two
potent and vocal campaigns is a narrow slice of those who genuinely want
to compare the consequences (benefits and costs) of regulatory choices. It
is very difficult for governments to maintain a steady commitment to
comparing benefits and costs when great political pressure is brought to
bear from one swath or the other.
In that light, I assess the Better Regulation initiative in terms of the
major reform strategies it invokes, and their counterparts in US law. I
address Impact Assessment (including both benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
and risk assessment as an input to BCA), the problem of addressing
multiple risks in concert, administrative costs, simplification, oversight, and ex post evaluation. For each of these issues, I offer suggestions
on how to make Better Regulation even better, focusing on institutional
innovations.

Impact Assessment
US Experience
In the United States, every President since the 1970s has formally
required some form of regulatory impact assessment. President Nixon
ordered a Quality of Life review, and President Ford ordered an inflationary impact review. President Carter issued Executive Order (EO) 12044
(23 March 1978), requiring economic analysis of regulations, and
creating the Regulatory Analysis Review Group to provide interagency
⁵¹ See Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Precaution in a Multirisk World’ Dennis J. Paustenbach
(ed), in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: Theory and Practice ( New York: John Wiley,
2002) 1509–31.
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oversight. In 1980, through the Paperwork Reduction Act,⁵² the US
Congress created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB/OIRA). On 17 February
1981, less than a month after taking office, President Reagan signed EO
12291,⁵³ requiring regulations to yield benefits that ‘outweigh’ their
costs, with a goal of maximizing net benefits, and directed OMB/OIRA
to serve as the White House office with the authority to oversee regulatory
impact analyses (RIAs).
On 30 September 1993, President Clinton issued EO 12866,⁵⁴ which
confirmed the bipartisan commitment to RIA using benefit-cost analysis
(BCA). EO 12866 replaced the word ‘outweigh’ with ‘justify’ (a less
quantitative term, embracing a broader public judgment about the policy’s merits). Section 1 of EO 12866 maintained the requirement to ‘maximize net benefits’, and in section 6 it expressly required full analysis of the
range of types of costs and benefits, including economic, social, and environmental. EO 12866 also added emphasis on qualitative and distributional impacts, added an instruction to evaluate the countervailing health
and environmental risks induced by regulation of a target risk (risk-risk
tradeoffs), and added new procedures for transparency (including reporting by OIRA of outside contacts, inclusion of agency representatives at
OIRA meetings held to discuss the agency’s policies, and oversight of
OIRA by a committee chaired by the Vice President).
Since the year 2001, the administration of current President Bush has
retained the Clinton EO, reconfirming the bipartisan character of regulatory review. The Bush administration OIRA has issued more ‘return’
letters (saying ‘no’ to deficient regulations) than did the Clinton administration OIRA, but at the same time the Bush OIRA has also innovated the
new device of ‘prompt letters’ (using BCA to say ‘yes’ to desirable regulations and urging agencies to adopt them; examples include requiring
trans-fat content labels on food to reduce heart disease, and installing
automatic electronic defibrillators in the workplace). OIRA has also
issued new RIA Guidelines in Circular A-4,⁵⁵ calling for more use of
⁵² Codified at 44 USC 3501 ff. Despite the name of this law, the US approach (mandated by the series of Presidential EOs) focuses on BCA—full assessment of both benefits
and costs—rather than on trying to reduce paperwork costs (administrative costs) alone.
⁵³ 46 Fed Reg 13193 (published 19 February 1981).
⁵⁴ Executive Order 12866, ‘Regulatory Planning and Review’, 58 Fed Reg 51735
(4 October 1993), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866. pdf.
As a senior staff person in the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) at the time,
I assisted in the drafting of EO 12866.
⁵⁵ OMB/OIRA, Circular A-4, ‘Regulatory Analysis’, 17 September 2003, available at
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
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cost-effectiveness analysis (C-EA), lower discount rates (3% as well as
7%, and potentially even lower than 3% for long-term intergenerational
effects), risk-risk tradeoff analysis, and probabilistic scenarios of impacts
exceeding $1 billion. Further, OIRA has issued guidelines as required by
the Information Quality Act, a bulletin on peer review, and a proposed
Bulletin on Risk Assessment. President Bush transferred oversight of
OIRA from the office of the Vice President to the office of the White
House Chief of Staff.⁵⁶ And OIRA now posts all significant documents
on its website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html.
In short, there is a bipartisan consensus among US Presidents of both
political parties over the last four decades to require agencies to produce
RIAs and to use BCA for risk management. One prominent author has
heralded the era of the ‘cost-benefit state’.⁵⁷ Another says that monetized
BCA has become ‘the norm for government policy’.⁵⁸ It should also be
noted that BCA in the US addresses all types of costs and benefits—
including economic, social, and environmental—and thus is comparable
to the ‘Integrated Impact Assessment’ conducted in the EU.⁵⁹
But BCA is still not applied to all regulatory policies in the US. Federal
agencies in the US appear to quantify some benefits or costs of regulatory
proposals most of the time, but to quantify and monetize both benefits
and costs only about half the time.⁶⁰ One reason for this incomplete use
of BCA may be that federal statutes vary in whether they require, permit,
or prohibit reliance on BCA in agency regulatory decision-making.
Congress often requires agencies to use BCA, as in the Consumer Product
Safety Act (CPSA 1972) (consumer products), Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA, 1975) (pesticides), Toxics
Substances Control Act (TSCA, section 6 (1977) (toxic substances), and
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA, 1995) (‘unfunded mandates’
⁵⁶ EO 13258 (2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo13258.pdf.
This shift in roles was apparently requested by Vice President Cheney, who preferred to
focus on other issues. In some administrations, there can be a difference of perspectives and
even competition between the President and Vice President, so the transfer of oversight
from the Vice President to the White House Chief of Staff may bring regulatory review
more closely in line with the President’s policy agenda. This would continue a trend toward
Presidential direction of regulatory matters that was already under way in the earlier Carter,
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, see Elena Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’,
(2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2246.
⁵⁷ Cass R Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2002).
⁵⁸ W Kip Viscusi, ‘Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation’
(2006) 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1033–44.
⁵⁹ IA Guidelines 2006, Annex 13, make clear that BCA in the EU also includes
economic, environmental, and social impacts.
⁶⁰ Hahn and Muething, (2003) 55 Admin L Rev 608–42.
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on states, businesses). Sometimes Congress permits BCA without requiring its use in decision-making, for example, in the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHAct 3(8), 1972) (as to workplace hazards other than
toxics), Clean Water Act (CWA, section 304, 1972) (water pollution
technology standards), and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, 1996
amendments) (drinking water contaminants). But some Congressional
statutes prohibit agencies’ use of BCA in regulation, such as the Clean Air
Act (CAA, section 109, 1970) (national ambient air quality standards),
OSHAct section 6(b)(5) (1972) (workplace toxics), Endangered Species
Act (ESA, section 7, 1973) (endangered species), Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA, section 3004m, 1984) (hazardous waste
treatment standards), and Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, section 121, 1986) (hazardous waste cleanup standards). The Presidential EOs requiring BCA do
not countermand a Congressional prohibition on using BCA to set standards, but they can require the agency to conduct a BCA as an informative
analytic matter even if the agency is prohibited by the statute from relying on the BCA in setting a standard. Thus, the incomplete application of
BCA suggests that OMB/OIRA has limited resources to supervise agency
conduct, that some impacts are difficult to quantify or monetize, and that
spreading the culture of impact assessment across the agencies is still a
work in progress.
Moreover, BCA is not required for several other aspects of US regulation. It is not required for Congressional legislation, although the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA, 1995) encourages it. Nor is it
required for international treaties involving regulatory commitments.⁶¹
Nor is BCA adequately employed in evaluating federal spending decisions, including both new spending and cutbacks,⁶² nor in evaluating
public works such as water resource projects (despite the history of BCA
being developed to evaluate dams since the 1930s),⁶³ nor in evaluating
⁶¹ Agency regulations adopted pursuant to an international treaty would presumably
be subject to EO 12866, but by the time such a regulation reaches OIRA the international
treaty has already been negotiated and ratified and the regulation is therefore difficult to
revise. To address this problem, the US State Department has recently proposed requiring
agencies to consult with OMB/OIRA earlier, on the regulatory impacts of pending new
international agreements. 71 Fed Reg 28831 (18 May 2006). The State Department
already requires agencies to consult with OMB before making new budgetary commitments in international agreements. See 22 CFR § 181.4(e).
⁶² See Robert W Hahn, ‘The Cost-Benefit of Budget Cutting’, AEI-Brookings Policy
Matters 06–12 (May 2006).
⁶³ The federal Reclamation Act of 1902 required economic analysis of projects, and the
federal Flood Control Act of 1936 required projects to demonstrate that ‘the benefits to
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national forest logging (despite section 6(k) of the 1976 National Forest
Management Act (NFMA), requiring economic suitability for timber
cutting). Nor is BCA required for major federal actions (such as projects
or policy decisions) under the environmental impact statement (EIS)
provision of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), despite an
early effort to incorporate BCA into the EIS as a way to strengthen
environmental protection.⁶⁴ Nor is BCA adequately employed in
evaluating trade measures, despite the requirement in Section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974 that trade safeguards must ‘provide greater economic
and social benefits than costs’.⁶⁵ Nor is BCA yet employed to evaluate
counterterrorism operations (despite the early history of BCA and systems analysis being brought to the US military by Defense Secretary
whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs’, 33 USC § 701a. Although
federal water agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation, US Department of the Interior,
evaluate some project benefits and costs, they typically have not conducted a full BCA
including environmental impacts. See Alan V Kneese, ‘Whatever Happened to BenefitCost Analysis?’ (2000) 116 Water Resources Updates 58–61, at http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/
updates/116/index.html. Economists have long argued for correcting this omission and
thereby protecting the environment by making greater use of BCA, including environmental impacts. See Maynard M Hufschmidt, ‘Benefit-Cost Analysis: 1933–85’ (2000) 116
Water Resources Update 42–9, at http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/116/index. html
(noting studies in 1950, 1958, and 1962 espousing this view, and changes proposed by
the Carter administration to expand BCA to ensure environmental protection in water
projects). Economist and BCA advocate Kip Viscusi wrote an early paper for the proenvironment Ralph Nader group making this point: federal water agencies’ BCA was
unduly narrow and should be expanded to account for environmental impacts. See Richard
L Berkman and W Kip Viscusi, Damming The West: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on the
Bureau of Reclamation (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). Viscusi continues to advocate BCA for both public works projects and regulations, see W Kip Viscusi, ‘Monetizing
the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation’, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working
Paper 06–09 (April 2006).
⁶⁴ See Judge Skelley Wright’s opinion in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v AEC,
449 F 2d 1109 (DC Cir 1971) (finding that the EIS provision in NEPA section 102(2)(C)
requires BCA of federal projects, in order to take into account their previously neglected
environmental costs), cert denied, 404 US 942 (1972). The US Supreme Court subsequently held that NEPA requires only a ‘purely procedural’ exercise of informed decisionmaking—a so-called ‘stop and think’ exercise—with no substantive criteria for such
decisions. See Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council Inc v Karlen, 444 US 223 (1980). NEPA
has been held by the courts not to apply to international trade agreements like NAFTA, see
Public Citizen v United States Trade Representative, 5 F 3d 549 (DC Cir 1993), nor to federal spending laws, Andrus v Sierra Club, 442 US 347 (1979). In addition, various exemptions to NEPA have been adopted, including statutory exemptions for EPA actions under
the Clean Air Act, 15 USC § 793(c)(1), and many actions under the Clean Water Act, 33
USC § 1371(c)(1); and judicial exemptions for EPA actions under environmental laws
deemed to require the ‘functional equivalent’ of the EIS process. See Jonathan M Cosco,
‘NEPA for the Gander: NEPA’s Application to Critical Habitat Designations and Other
“Benevolent” Federal Action’ (1998) 8 Duke Envtl L & Pol’y F 345.
⁶⁵ 19 USC 2251(a).
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Robert McNamara’s ‘Whiz Kids’ in the 1960s), and it is only beginning
to be applied (with difficulty) to the new wave of homeland security
regulations.⁶⁶

European Experience
In the European Union, Impact Assessment of new regulations is now
required in almost all countries and at the EU level, and BCA is increasingly employed. There is a long history of the use of environmental
impact assessment used to inform decision-makers (as under NEPA in
the US), with some versions requiring actual financial compensation for
the environmental harms of projects,⁶⁷ and thus a kind of BCA imposed
on projects through tort law or the law of expropriation (takings) of
neighbors’ property.
BCA applied to modern regulatory decisions is also increasingly
required in Europe. Most generally, the Proportionality Principle, a general
principle of European law,⁶⁸ has been held to imply some version of BCA.
In the Pfizer case, the court observed (paras 410–11):
The Court considers that a cost/benefit analysis is a particular expression of
the principle of proportionality in cases involving risk management . . . . the
⁶⁶ See Jessica Stern and Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’ (2006) 9
J Risk Research 393–447 and also in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer, and David Gordon
(eds), Managing Strategic Surprise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming
2007). Analysis of counterterrorism policies (both domestic homeland security and external intelligence and military operations) is particularly urgent, because effective counterterrorism is essential, but counterproductive policies can do serious damage to national
security as well as to human life. See ibid (arguing that little serious ex ante analysis was
done of the Iraq invasion, with the result that serious countervailing risks were neglected,
including collateral civilian deaths, blowback, bog-down, distraction, and theft; and advocating subjecting counterterrorism policies to a joint OIRA-NSC oversight process using
analytic tools of BCA and risk-risk tradeoff analysis); Linda Bilmes and Joseph E Stiglitz,
‘The Economic Costs of the Iraq War’ (2006) National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Working Paper 12054, available at www.z.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/
newworks.cfm (arguing that the costs of the Iraq War were greatly underestimated
ex ante, and calling for BCA of future such interventions). See generally Barbara Tuchman,
The March of Folly (New York: Knopf, 1984) (on the counterproductive results of military
campaigns undertaken without adequate analysis of likely outcomes). Yet these policies are
difficult to analyze because information may be classified, because terrorists are strategic
agents who respond to preventive measures hence requiring dynamic game theory models,
and because some consequences may be hard to quantify (eg loss of privacy and freedom).
⁶⁷ See Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision Making
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) (focusing on the history in the UK), including
her discussion of the compensation requirement under the writ ad quod damnum in the
thirteenth century.
⁶⁸ Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative
Study (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996).
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principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of
Community law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions
should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to
attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question, and
where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be
had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued . . . .⁶⁹

The Communication on the Precautionary Principle of February 2000
requires precautionary regulations to be proportional to the chosen level
of protection, non-discriminatory in their application, consistent with
similar measures already taken, based on an examination of the potential
benefits and costs of action or lack of action (including, where appropriate
and feasible, an economic cost/benefit analysis), subject to review in the
light of new scientific data, and capable of assigning responsibility for
producing the scientific evidence necessary for a more comprehensive risk
assessment. In effect, the Communication reclaims the PP as part of
decision analysis.⁷⁰
Adopted late in 2000, the Nice Treaty of the EU (building on
the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties) provides in Article 174(3)
that European environmental policy must be based on an assessment
of ‘the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action’. Unlike
in the US, it does not appear that any European Union laws prohibit
the use of BCA, although such prohibitions may exist in member
states’ laws.
⁶⁹ Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council, 2002 WL 31337 (European Court
of First Instance, 11 September 2002). But the court remarked in para. 456: ‘The Court
observes that the importance of the objective pursued by the contested regulation, i.e. the
protection of human health, may justify adverse consequences, and even substantial adverse
consequences, for certain traders . . . The protection of public health, which the contested
regulation is intended to guarantee, must take precedence over economic considerations.’
⁷⁰ Several scholars have developed approaches to melding the PP with consequentialist
decision analysis. See eg Ralph L Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt, ‘Appraising the
Precautionary Principle—A Decision Analysis Perspective’ (2001) 4 J Risk Research 191;
John D Graham, ‘Decision-Analytic Refinements of the Precautionary Principle’ (2001)
4 J Risk Research 127; Olivier Godard, Claude Henry, Patrick Lagadec, and Erwann
Michel-Kerian, Traité des Nouveaux Risques (Paris: Gallimard, 2002); Richard B Stewart,
‘Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking under Uncertainty’ (2002) 20 Research in
Law and Economics 71–152; Michael Dekay, Mitchell Small, Paul Fischbeck, Scott
Farrow, Alison Cullen, J B Kadane, Lester Lave, Granger Morgan, and K Takemura, ‘RiskBased Decision Analysis in Support of Precautionary Policies’ (2002) 5 J Risk Research
391; Scott Farrow, ‘Using Risk-Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to
Implement a Precautionary Principle’ (2004) 24 Risk Analysis 727; Christian Gollier and
Nicolas Treich, ‘Decision Making under Uncertainty: The Economics of the Precautionary
Principle’ (2003) 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 77; Pauline Barrieu and Bernard SinclairDégagné, ‘On Precautionary Policies’ (forthcoming 2006) Management Science.
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The new EU ‘Better Regulation’ initiative has launched Impact
Assessment Guidelines (2002, revised 2005, updated 2006) requiring a
form of BCA.⁷¹ The IA Guidelines require identification of the
problem, consideration of alternative policy options (including no
action), and assessment of the ‘positive and negative’ economic, social,
and environmental impacts (including direct and indirect impacts) of
each policy option.⁷² The Guidelines use the terminology of ‘positive
and negative impacts’ to include both a fully quantified and monetized
BCA, and a partially quantified/partially qualitative ‘multi-criteria
analysis’, as well as a cost-effectiveness analysis where relevant.⁷³ This is
similar to the provisions of US EO 12866 and of OMB Circular A-4,
calling for an RIA including both quantitative and qualitative
evaluation of all benefits and costs and giving guidance on BCA and
C-EA. (The US uses the term BCA to refer to both the fully quantified
and monetized BCA, and the partially quantified/partially qualitative
analysis of benefits and costs, described in the EU Guidelines.) Further,
like EO 12866, the EU Guidelines provide that ‘A measure is
considered justified where net benefits can be expected from the
intervention’.⁷⁴
Of the 70 Extended IAs conducted by the European Commission so
far (2003–5), fewer than 40 percent quantify and monetize either
benefits or costs, and only 17 percent compared net benefits.⁷⁵ These
figures are lower than the comparable statistics for the US (cited above),
but the EU system has been in operation for a much shorter period of
time. Also, in principle, the EU RIA system applies to all legislation, at
least to directives and regulations initiated by the European Commission,
and to amendments adopted by the European Parliament. The
Commission’s monopoly on initiating legislation means that requiring IA
of European Commission proposals is in a sense more akin to requiring
IA of Congressional bills in the US—a power that US Presidents and
OMB/OIRA do not have.

⁷¹ See IA Guidelines 2005 and 2006, nn. 5–6 above. For discussion, see Andrea Renda,
Impact Assessment in the EU (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2006); Lucas
Bergkamp, European Community Law for the New Economy (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004),
169. By ‘a form of BCA’, I mean some analysis of benefits and costs, ie of positive and negative impacts, and not a particular version that eg requires or eschews quantified monetized
values.
⁷² IA Guidelines 2006, Part III, at 16–46.
⁷³ See IA Guidelines 2006 at 13 and at 39 and n 45, and Annex 13, ‘Methods on
Comparing Impacts’.
⁷⁴ See IA Guidelines 2006, Annex 13.1.
⁷⁵ Andrea Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU, n. 71 above, at 63.
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Several EU member states have adopted strong Better Regulation
programs with RIA procedures.⁷⁶ For example:
●

●

The UK has conducted several reviews of its risk regulation system,⁷⁷
created the Better Regulation Executive⁷⁸ in the Cabinet Office, and
the external advisory Better Regulation Commission. The government announced a Better Regulation Action Plan,⁷⁹ and developed
comprehensive guidelines on risk management which instruct government bodies to seek transparency and proportionality through
the use of risk assessment, analysis of market failures, valuation (of
monetary and non-monetary impacts, including attention to public
concerns), impact assessment including benefit-cost analysis of alternative policy options, and monitoring of policy implementation.⁸⁰
Ireland has created a regulatory reform office in the Department of the
Taoiseach, and a Statutory Law Revision and Consolidation Unit in
the Office of the Attorney General.⁸¹ Ireland began these efforts
through a Coordinating Group of Secretaries in 1995, which issued a
report on Delivering Better Government in 1996.⁸²These efforts were
organized under the Strategic Management Initiative and its Working
Group on Regulatory Reform. The government issued a report on
Reducing Red Tape in 1999,⁸³ and a report on Regulating Better in
2004,⁸⁴ committing to rigorous use of Regulatory Impact Analysis.

⁷⁶ For more on RIAs in a variety of countries, see OECD, RIA Inventory (Paris: OECD,
2003).
⁷⁷ These include the Hampton review on Reducing Administrative Burdens (2005) at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget/budget_05/press_notices/bud_bud05_
presshampton.cfm, the Macrory review on Regulatory Penalties (interim consultation document, May 2006) at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/reviewing_regulation/
penalties/index.asp, and the Davidson review on implementation of EU legislation
(forthcoming 2006), as well as the Better Regulation Task Force (now Commission) report
on Regulation—Less is More (March 2005) at http://www.brc.gov.uk/publications/
lessismoreentry.asp. For further details and links to each document see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/.
⁷⁸ See http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/.
⁷⁹ See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./newsroom_and_speeches/press/2005/press_
50_05.cfm.
⁸⁰ See HM Treasury, The Green Book (2003); HM Treasury, ‘Managing Risks to the
Public: Appraisal Guidance’ (June 2005). For an overview of these efforts, see UK House
of Lords, Economic Affairs Committee, Government Policy on the Management of Risk
(June 2006), at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeconaf/
183/183i.pdf.
⁸¹ See http://www.betterregulation.ie/.
⁸² Available at http://www.betterregulation.ie/attached_files/upload/static/1151.pdf.
⁸³ Available at http://www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp?docID37.
⁸⁴ Department of the Taoiseach, Regulating Better: A Government White Paper Setting
out Six Principles of Better Regulation (January 2004), available at http://www.betterregulation.ie/upload/Regulating_Better_html/index.html.
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In June 2005 it decided to require RIA across all departments, and
in October 2005 the government issued RIA Guidelines.⁸⁵
The Netherlands has adopted a strong program of Administrative
Cost reduction, including pioneering the Standard Cost Model
which is now being borrowed by many other countries,⁸⁶ and setting
a goal of 25 percent reduction of administrative burden.⁸⁷ But it
remains to be seen whether the Netherlands will undertake a broader
program of Better Regulation using Impact Assessment and BCA.
France, although it did not begin to adopt Better Regulation measures until more recently, has now created a Better Regulation
office at the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Industry (transferring functions there from the Réforme de l’Etat previously in the
Prime Minister’s office, in order to combine regulatory oversight
with budgetary oversight). France has also launched a Better
Regulation program in the Conseil d’Etat. And France has proposed a new law requiring impact assessment of all new legislation.
Germany, under its new coalition government headed by
Chancellor Angela Merkel, has made better regulation a high priority. Under the rubric ‘Scaling Back Bureaucracy’, the Merkel
government has appointed a minister to lead the program, adopted
the Standard Cost Model as well as RIA Guidelines, and begun an
assessment of administrative burdens with a view to adopting a
political goal to reduce such burdens in the near future.

In its 16 March 2005 Communication on Better Regulation, the
European Commission attached a chart summarizing progress on Better
Regulation and Impact Assessment (see below, pp. 472–3).⁸⁸ Events are
moving quickly in this field, so this chart may already be out of date. Still,
the chart is noteworthy for its very clear effort to shame laggard countries
into adopting Impact Assessment procedures. Denmark, Poland, and the
⁸⁵ See RIA Guidelines: ‘How to Conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis’, and
‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: Lessons from the Pilot Exercise’, both available at
http://www.betterregulation.ie/eng/index.asp?docID80.
⁸⁶ The Standard Cost Model Network, a consortium of countries using this approach,
is at www.administrative-burdens.com.
⁸⁷ See Bert Doorn and Christiaan Prins, ‘A Dutch Treat: The Netherlands Presidency
and Regulatory Reform’, Challenge Europe, Issue 13—What Future for Europe’s Economic
and Social Model? (30 January 2005), at http://www.theepc.be/en/ce.asp?TYP
CE&LV177&seey&t42&PGCE/EN/detail&l2&AI417.
⁸⁸ Adapted from European Commission, Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the
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UK scored the highest (10 points out of a possible 11); France, Portugal,
and Cyprus scored zero. But as noted above, already France has taken
important actions since this chart was published.
Of course, even where countries have adopted IA systems, they may
be implementing such reviews in different ways. For example, Radaelli
finds that IA is aimed at improving substantive policy consequences in
the US, at managing the bureaucracy in the UK, at transparency in the
Netherlands, and at formal adherence to rules in countries like France
and Germany.⁸⁹ But IA arguably serves all of these objectives in each of
these countries; certainly it does in the US. And IA is also an evolving program, so that the substantive consequentialism of US regulatory review
and the transparency of Dutch administrative cost measurement may
well be adopted in other countries over time.

A Brief Evaluation
It is by now fairly clear that the choice to use IA and BCA is not a partisan
matter. IA is a tool for better decision-making employed on both the
center-left and the center-right, and it is a mechanism of interbranch relations—to enable Presidential management of the regulatory state (both
in the US and in the European Union). It has become the mainstream
consensus approach, albeit with critics on each flank. In the United
States, IA using economic analysis such as BCA has been espoused by a
wide array of actors across the political spectrum, including not only
Republican Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bushes, but also
Democratic Presidents Carter and Clinton, Judge Skelley Wright (in the
Calvert Cliffs case cited above), US Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer⁹⁰ (appointed to the Court by President Clinton), and law professors Cass Sunstein⁹¹ and Buzz Thompson,⁹² among many others, as well
European Union’, COM(2005) 97, SEC(2005) 175, 16 March 2005, n 4 above, at 17
(footnote omitted). The footnote in the table (omitted here) references the chart to
‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Report on the Implementation of the European
Charter for Small Enterprises in the Member States of the European Union—SEC(2005)
167, 8.2.2005, p. 36’, but the chart addresses Impact Assessment procedures in general and
only the last two columns address impacts on small businesses.
⁸⁹ See Radaelli, n 27 above.
⁹⁰ Breyer, n 25 above.
⁹¹ Cass R Sunstein, Risk and Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
Sunstein, n 57 above. Sunstein is also the author of Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme RightWing Courts are Wrong for America (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
⁹² Barton Thompson, Jr, ‘People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for
Optimal Biodiversity’, (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1127.
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as many economists of diverse political persuasions,⁹³ including Alan
Blinder⁹⁴ and Joseph Stiglitz.⁹⁵ In Europe, Better Regulation via IA is
espoused by a chorus of political leaders across the political spectrum,
including Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Bertie Ahern, Romano Prodi, Jose
Manuel Barroso, Gunther Verheugen, and others; and it has been
adopted by both the European Commission and the EU member states.
At the same time, IA of regulations, especially IA using BCA, has been
criticized as anti-environmental, chiefly on the grounds that it tends to
delay regulations and to overstate costs and understate health and environmental benefits (such as human life, ecological vitality, and aesthetics)
which are difficult to measure.⁹⁶ Similarly, environmental IA under NEPA
has been criticized—notably by industry and the military—for delaying
new projects. (As I point out below, another distinct problem with BCA
occurs when it focuses narrowly on a target risk and on industry compliance costs, to the neglect of countervailing risks and ancillary benefits.)
Advocates of BCA answer that if BCA is done well, it will measure all
important impacts. They are optimistic about the ability of economic
methods to develop quantified and monetized measures even of amenities
⁹³ Eg Kenneth Arrow, Maureen Cropper, George Eads, Robert Hahn, Lester Lave,
Roger Noll, Paul Portney, Milt Russell, Richard Schmalensee, Kerry Smith, and Robert
Stavins, ‘Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?’, (1996) 272 Science 221–2 (advocating the use of BCA as a tool to help
inform regulatory policy decisions).
⁹⁴ See Alan Blinder, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society
(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1988). Prof Blinder was a member of the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) appointed by President Clinton.
⁹⁵ Joseph Stiglitz was first a member and later Chair of CEA under President Clinton,
and winner of the Nobel Prize. While a critic of laissez-faire globalization (see Stiglitz, n 24
above), Prof Stiglitz has espoused BCA with improvements to reflect advances in economic
understanding, as reflected in his support and role in the drafting of President Clinton’s EO
12866, and in his scholarship such as Joseph E Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (3rd
edn) (New York: WW Norton, 2000); Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘The Rate of Discount for CostBenefit Analysis and the Theory of the Second Best’, in R Lind (ed), Discounting for Time
and Risk in Energy Policy (Washington, DC: RFF Press, 1982) 151–204. And he has recently
written: ‘The most important things in life—like life itself—are priceless. But that does not
mean that issues involving the preservation of life (or a way of life), like defense, should
not be subjected to cool, hard economic analysis’. Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Analysis on True
Cost-Benefit of Iraq “Project” Virtually Absent’, Daily Yomiuri Online, 4 March 2006, at
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/syndicate/20060313dy02.htm. See also Bilmes
and Stiglitz, n 66 above (advocating BCA).
⁹⁶ See David Driesen, ‘Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?’ (2006) 77 U Colo L Rev 335;
Frank Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling, and Rachel Massey, ‘Applying Cost-Benefit to Past
Decisions: Was Environmental Protection ever a Good Idea?’ (2005) 57 Admin L Rev 155.
Other critiques attack the ethics of monetizing health and environmental benefits, see
Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: Knowing the Price of Everything and the
Value of Nothing (New York: The New Press 2004). Rebuttals to these critiques include
Viscusi, n 58 above; and Robert W Hahn, In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2005).
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not traded in markets.⁹⁷ And they point to the transparency gains of
forcing decisions to be based on a rigorous analysis made available to
the public.
An additional point is that, if costs to industry will inevitably be pressed
by industry lobbyists (with or without BCA), then failing to quantify
health and environmental benefits (by eschewing BCA) will actually lead to
underprotection of those social values. If interest group politics favors
concentrated industry groups over diffuse environmental beneficiaries,
then BCA is more important to clarify the benefits than the costs. If risk
reduction or other benefits are not quantified and compared via BCA, those
benefits will be neglected in a political calculus that inevitably focuses on
cost. To be sure, much costly environmental legislation has been enacted
without quantification of benefits (or costs), but those laws may represent
interest group deals more than a maximization of public net benefits.
And, fundamentally, advocates respond: if government does not use
some version of comparing benefits and costs, then on what alternative
basis will it make decisions? Critics of BCA often fail to explain an alternative method for making decisions.⁹⁸ Not comparing benefits and costs
may simply lead to decisions which are less transparent, less subject to
debate and correction, and more arbitrary and biased than is BCA, that is,
to decisions which are driven by overreaction to crisis events,⁹⁹ underreaction to routine, systemic, or unseen concerns,¹⁰⁰ and raw political
⁹⁷ Eg Viscusi says: ‘any regulatory benefit from a risk regulation or environmental regulation that should be legitimately recognized in the policy analysis process potentially can
be quantified in monetary terms’. Viscusi, n 58 above.
⁹⁸ Some advocate setting standards ‘as low as feasible’, but a feasibility test would be
insensitive to benefits, would regulate more profitable industries more tightly than less
profitable industries (sending perverse signals and potentially conflicting with environmental justice concerns by protecting poorer communities less than richer communities),
and would be less protective than BCA where BCA would warrant shutting down a noxious industry but the ‘feasible’ constraint would keep the industry in business.
⁹⁹ See Robert V Percival, ‘Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective
Action’, (1998) 9 Duke Envtl L & Pol’y F 9; Thomas Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda
Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
1997); Thomas Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006).
¹⁰⁰ See Cass R Sunstein, ‘Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2000)29 Journal of
Legal Studies, reprinted in Mathew Adler and Eric Posner (eds), Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and
Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) (arguing that the public and government give inadequate attention to low-probability high-consequence risks of extreme
events, but that on BCA criteria such risks should be addressed more aggressively);
Jonathan B Wiener, Book review of Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2004)
and Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005), in (2005) 24
Journal of Policy Analysis & Management 885–9; Cass R Sunstein, ‘On the Divergent
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change’, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 06–13 (May 2006).
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power (especially of concentrated industry groups) rather than analysis.
The alternative to analysis may often be sanctimony—acting without
analyzing, on the supposition that we ‘know’ the right answer—hastily
choosing regulation or deregulation, green technologies or counterterror
tactics, depending on who is in power.
In advising the European Commission on these questions, the
Mandelkern Group Report rejected claims of bias:
Some see RIAs as an excuse to impose a business-focused, deregulatory agenda on
policy makers. For a RIA done well, this is absolutely not the case. Rather, as
stated elsewhere, the RIA simply sets out the information in a clear and concise
way to inform—not control—the political decision. This point needs to be
stressed as appropriate and real efforts need to be made to ensure that both benefits and costs are included in the assessment.
Another possible problem is the political pressure to do something—anything—
now, irrespective of a proper assessment (sometimes known in its most extreme
form as a ‘knee-jerk reaction’) . . . . development of a good RIA system is likely to
reduce the incidence of this reaction as the need for good assessment becomes
commonly understood and supported . . . .
A further situation can be where the main political decision has already been
taken (perhaps in a government programme or party manifesto). In these cases
there can be a reluctance to undertake assessment of the implementation options
available. However, almost always details remain to be resolved where an assessment can play an important role in informing, in a very explicit manner, those
taking the decisions on the details about the trade-offs that they are making.
Finally, there is often the perception that doing RIA takes too much time and
delays the policy development process to an unacceptable degree. However, when
RIA is an integrated part of the process, any delays in the earlier stages are minimised and often outweighed by time and cost savings later in the process where
the greater defensibility of the policy solutions and the increased buy-in by stakeholders are important.¹⁰¹

There is not the space here to sort out this entire debate. After briefly
assessing the pros and cons of IA in this subsection, I suggest in the next
subsection that Europe, committed as it already is to using IA in Better
Regulation, should experiment with a set of institutional innovations
which will test whether the criticisms can be overcome and whether IA
can thus be made to perform even better than it has so far.
The criticisms of IA (especially using BCA) seem to me to be worth
taking seriously, but not fatal to a sensible application of weighing the pros
and cons of important decisions. There is no better alternative way of
¹⁰¹ Mandelkern Group Report (2001) at 25.
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making policy, and it has become the mainstream consensus approach.
The criticisms should therefore motivate better policy analysis, not its
rejection. The concerns about omission of important impacts, including
countervailing risks and ancillary benefits, are crucial; as I suggest below,
they warrant a broader more embracing form of BCA. The concern about
delay is quite important, but delay is amenable to a weighing of its own pros
and cons. The benefit of delay is that additional analysis can improve
decisions (and defer policy burdens); the cost is that delay can forfeit the
value of earlier policy adoption (eg earlier protection of victims, or earlier
authorization of a useful invention). Weighing these conflicting effects is
the task of Value of Information/Cost of Information (VOI/COI) techniques, one component of BCA. This idea is reflected in the European IA
Guidelines’ doctrine of ‘proportionate analysis’, and roughly in the difference between initial IA and Extended IA in Europe, as well as initial
Environmental Assessments versus full Environmental Impact Statements
under US NEPA law, and insignificant versus significant regulatory actions
under OMB review. Note that the cost of delay cuts both ways: who bears
its costs depends on the default rule in force while the analysis is pending.
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) may delay regulation of private actors,
while environmental impact assessment (EIA) may delay projects sought
by private actors. The delays posed by RIA themselves can cut both ways,
depending on who bears the cost of the delay: if the law requires IA before
adopting a regulation that would restrict a risky product or facility (as for
many pollution controls), then delay favors industry and the cost is borne
by victims; but if the law requires IA before licensing of a new product or
site (as for new drugs or pesticides or energy facilities), then delay favors
victims and the cost is borne by industry and consumers. The question is
institutional rather than analytic. Moreover, as the Mandelkern group
points out, a careful IA can resolve and avoid problems that would yield
delay later on, so it can achieve less delay overall. In short, delay turns out to
be a problem that calls for better BCA, not avoiding BCA.
Meanwhile, retrospective analyses of a variety of policies do not bear
out the concern that BCA is biased toward overstating costs and understating benefits. Ex post evaluations of a growing set of cases (though not
yet a representative sample) have found that both benefits and costs
appear to have been overstated in ex ante RIAs.¹⁰² Certainly specific cases
¹⁰² See OMB, Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities
(Washington, DC: US Office of Management and Budget, 2005), ch III, 41–9; Winston
Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, ‘On the Accuracy of Regulatory
Cost Estimates’ (2000) 19 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 297–332.
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can be cited of BCA recommending less stringent regulation, but perhaps
those recommendations were warranted. In several other key cases, RIA
and BCA have been used to identify and promulgate some of the most
important advances in more stringent environmental and health
protection. These include the phaseout of CFCs, the phasedown of lead
(Pb) in gasoline (petrol), and the restrictions on particulate matter
emissions from power plants and diesel engines.¹⁰³ Indeed these are three
policies on which the US, using BCA, adopted policies that were
substantially more precautionary (earlier and more stringent) than
Europe.¹⁰⁴ Critics contend that in the past BCA has more often been used
to reduce than to increase the stringency of new regulations.¹⁰⁵ As I argue
below, even if this is true, it is as much or more a result of the institutional
posture of BCA as of the analytic methodology of BCA, and both of these
can be ameliorated in the European program of Better Regulation.
Why might costs and benefits be over- or understated in ex ante BCA?
Costs may be overstated ex ante if industry opposes regulation citing high
cost estimates, and then once a rule is imposed, industry finds less costly
means of complying than it thought or said it could (though at some
expense of managerial time); and if the extent of implementation of the
policy is predicted ex ante to be greater than it actually turns out to be.
On the other hand, costs could be understated ex ante if they focus on a
subset of costs such as industry compliance costs and neglect wider or
longer-term effects such as foregone innovation.
Benefits may be understated ex ante if risk assessments focus on one risk
at a time and omit multiple simultaneous exposures; if they neglect lowprobability extreme events; if they neglect sensitive subpopulations; or if
they omit ancillary benefits from unintended reductions in other risks.
¹⁰³ Ackerman et al, n 96 above , review the Lead Phasedown and argue that it does not
show the success of BCA in supporting a more stringent policy on lead (Pb) in gasoline
because the BCA came late in the story (in the 1980s), after several decades of the use of
lead in gasoline (since the 1920s) and after a prior regulation to reduce lead in gasoline had
been adopted in the 1970s without reliance on BCA. By contrast, Driesen, n 96 above, at
364, states that ‘this case does seem to offer reasonably good evidence of CBA motivating
an increase in stringency’. In addition, the conclusion to be drawn from the Ackerman et al
critique is not that BCA did not support a more aggressive phaseout of lead in gasoline
(it did), but that BCA should have been undertaken decades earlier. Ackerman et al say that
BCA could not have been conducted earlier because the data on health effects of lead were
lacking, yet they cite evidence of the longstanding scientific appreciation of the adverse
health effects of lead exposure; and they neglect the endogenous character of benefits data:
if BCA had been required or undertaken, evidence to quantify the benefits would have
been sought and collected. The reduction in lead emissions due to the first regulation in the
1970s was not the only way to generate exposure and dose-response data, as Ackerman et al
assert; variations across locations, and changes in exposure over prior decades, could also
have been studied.
¹⁰⁴ See Wiener, n 14 above.
¹⁰⁵ See Driesen, n 96 above.
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And benefits may be understated ex ante if monetized BCA omits or
underestimates impacts that are difficult to measure in monetary terms. On
the other hand, benefits may be overstated ex ante if the implementation
of the policy is predicted to be greater than actually turns out to occur; if
countervailing risks created by the policy are omitted; if the methods of
valuation used to monetize environmental benefits (such as contingent
valuation surveys regarding non-market assets such as ecosystems) tend to
overstate benefits or if the risk assessments which underlie the calculation
of policy benefits use conservative default assumptions and methods that
tend to overstate risks and hence benefits (due to such factors as overstated
linear no-threshold dose-response extrapolations, use of most sensitive test
species, identifying any observed effect as adverse, making animal-to-human
extrapolations without accounting for mechanistic differences (‘modes of
action’), using ‘maximum exposed individual’ exposure assumptions, and
using large safety factors for extrapolation to human subpopulations).
The result is that risk assessment exhibits simultaneous excessive
attention to some (small) risks, and inattention to other (larger) risks.
To address many of these problems, US EPA has adopted new cancer risk
assessment guidelines,¹⁰⁶ which require greater use of evidence before
resorting to conservative default assumptions, greater attention to modes
of action, and more attention to children and other susceptible subgroups. And US OMB/OIRA has issued a proposed Bulletin on Risk
Assessment in January 2006,¹⁰⁷ seeking to ensure greater transparency
and realism, use of central estimates, and consistent criteria for identifying adverse effects. In addition, although few statutes specify the criteria
for scientific risk assessment,¹⁰⁸ courts have begun to apply general statutory edicts to use the ‘best available science’ to require agencies to conduct
high-quality risk assessments.¹⁰⁹
¹⁰⁶ US Environmental Protection Agency (2005), Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, EP/630/P-03/0001F www.epa.gov/cancerguidelines.
¹⁰⁷ US OMB, Proposed Bulletin on Risk Assessment, 9 January 2006, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html#iq. This initiative is endorsed in
concept by Nicholas Bagley and Richard L Revesz, ‘Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State’, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related publication 06–12
(April 2006), at 44–53 (forthcoming in (2006) 106 Columbia L Rev, Section IV.A).
¹⁰⁸ See Kelsey Stansell, Mark Marvelli, and Jonathan B Wiener, ‘ “Adverse Effects” And
Similar Terms In U.S. Law’, Report for the Dose Response Specialty Group of the Society
for Risk Analysis (SRA) (July 2005), available at www.sra.org/drsg/docs/Adverse_
Effects_Report.pdf.
¹⁰⁹ Eg Chlorine Chemistry Council v EPA, 206 F 3d 1286 (DC Cir 2000) (vacating goal
for maximum level of chloroform because agency set goal based on linear low-dose extrapolation when it had just found that a threshold model was superior). See also Leather
Industries v EPA, 40 F 3d 392 (DC Cir 1994) (remanding standard for selenium content
in sewage sludge because the exposure assumption—children eating sludge on highway
median strips—was not credible).

480

Jonathan B Wiener

To make Better Regulation effective, European institutions need to
address these questions of risk assessment as well. So far, the approach of
European institutions to risk assessment has been ad hoc or ill-defined. In
the EU, the move toward quantitative risk assessment has been more
recent than in the US (where it accelerated in the 1980s following the US
Supreme Court’s Benzene decision¹¹⁰ and the 1983 publication of the
National Academy of Sciences ‘Redbook’.¹¹¹) EU use of risk assessment
has been driven in part by WTO decisions under the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), which requires a scientific
risk assessment to support international trade restrictions.¹¹² The
European Commission has espoused scientific risk assessment as a predicate to any invocation of the precautionary principle,¹¹³ and the
European Court of Justice held, in a case on mad cow disease (BSE) quite
reminiscent of Benzene, that member state governments may not invoke
precaution to regulate risks that the Commission has deemed insignificant.¹¹⁴ Still, major risk regulations within the EU sometimes proceed
without risk assessments, as in the recent Pfizer and Alpharma cases
regarding antibiotics in animal feed,¹¹⁵ in which the Court of First
Instance held that a ban could be adopted without a risk assessment and
even when the relevant scientific advisory committee had recommended
against a ban or had not been consulted at all (despite a requirement
for such consultation). The court ruled in the Pfizer case, paras 139
and 142–44:
. . . a risk assessment cannot be required to provide the Community institutions
with conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the seriousness of
the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality . . . . [But] a preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to the
risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified . . . a
¹¹⁰ Industrial Union Dept, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607
(1980).
¹¹¹ NAS/NRC, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1983).
¹¹² See Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by
World Trade Rules’ (2000) 13 Tulane Envtl LJ 271.
¹¹³ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 1, Brussels, 2 February, 2000, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.
¹¹⁴ Case 1/00, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (Failure of a
Member State to fulfill its obligations—Refusal to end the ban on British beef and veal),
2001 ECR I-09989 (European Court of Justice, 2001).
¹¹⁵ Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council, 2002 WL 31337 (European
Court of First Instance, 11 September 2002); Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc v Council, 2002
WL 31338 (European Court of First Instance, 11 September 2002).
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preventive measure may be taken only if the risk, although the reality and extent
thereof have not been ‘fully demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence,’
appears nevertheless to be adequately backed up by the scientific data available at
the time when the measure was taken.

This statement is confusing. The court appears to misunderstand the
purpose of a risk assessment, which is never to provide ‘conclusive scientific evidence’ (which does not exist) but rather to provide a forecast of
(inevitably uncertain) future risks. The court holds that a ‘purely hypothetical’ risk or ‘mere conjecture’ is inadequate, but that a risk assessment
is not required, and it remains unclear what the court means by its alternative of ‘adequately backed up by the scientific data’—an invitation to
further litigation. The Better Regulation initiative should resolve these
confusions by requiring risk assessment (as called for in the European
Commission’s February 2000 Communication on the Precautionary
Principle), setting criteria for risk assessments, and explaining that risk
assessment is a method to forecast uncertain future scenarios.
Nor is incomplete information a reason to reject BCA. Information
about future events is never complete or certain. Given uncertainty, some
form of BCA seems superior to the alternative methods of decisionmaking. A raw political (non-analytic) choice of goals would be arbitrary or
distorted by rent-seeking politics; even if well-intentioned, it may simply
neglect important costs and benefits (especially to those who lack effective
political voice) and thereby yield policy errors.¹¹⁶ The Mandelkern Group
advised that it is certainly sometimes the case that there is a
paucity of good quality data on benefits and costs, including the difficulty of estimating the value of non-marketed goods (e.g. environmental degradation or
damage to human health). Whilst this will indeed affect the overall quality of the
assessment—which can only be as good as the inputted data—it is not a sufficient
argument for not carrying out any assessment at all. Use of error estimation and
ranges (rather than single figures) for benefits and costs can help, as can the input
from consultation with stakeholders and intelligent use of available data, consultants and academic expertise. Seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders
can help avoid the kind of bias otherwise possible from vested interests.¹¹⁷

Likewise, the US Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines
for environmental IA under NEPA address uncertainty by requiring the
¹¹⁶ See John D Graham and Jonathan B Wiener, Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting
Health and the Environment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995) (arguing
that failure to analyze full impacts of policy choices often results in selective neglect of
impacts on constituencies lacking effective political voice; thus, good impact assessment
can advance both efficiency and equity).
¹¹⁷ Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 24.

482

Jonathan B Wiener

agency to obtain additional information at reasonable cost, to describe
the remaining uncertainties, and to make an express judgment about the
importance of such questions for the impacts being assessed.¹¹⁸ As noted
above, in its IA Guidelines in 2005, the European Commission addressed
this issue through the doctrine of ‘proportionate analysis’, requiring services of the Commission to invest in additional information where the
benefits of doing so (in improved decisions) justify the costs.¹¹⁹

Institutional Innovations
Given its commitment to IA as the key tool for Better Regulation, Europe
now faces the debate over the pros and cons of BCA, and, at the same
time, an opportunity to make progress through institutional innovations.
Many of the real problems with IA and BCA are institutional, not analytic. Economics is not fundamentally opposed to ecology: both words
derive from the Greek oikos for household, and they should be able to
cohabit graciously. The concern that the tools of IA and BCA are biased
against environmental protection arises largely because of the institutional postures in which the tools are applied: too coldly, to ‘just say no’,
and too narrowly. Making progress on these institutional biases by using
BCA more ‘warmly’, using it to say ‘yes’ as well as no, and using it more
widely, would make Better Regulation even better.
IA and BCA are tools, not rules. They are mechanisms to inform
decision-making, not the decision itself. The decision itself is and must be
an exercise of judgment by a public official. Policy must be based on and
express that judgment, rather than be dictated by a cold numerical
¹¹⁸ 40 CFR 1502.22 (promulgated at 51 Fed Reg 15625, 25 April 1986) (‘(a) If the
incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is
essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are
not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact
statement. (b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the
means to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within the environmental
impact statement: (1) A statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable;
(2) a statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a
summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment, and
(4) the agency’s evaluation of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research
methods generally accepted in the scientific community. For the purposes of this section,
“reasonably foreseeable’’ includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if
their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the
rule of reason.’).
¹¹⁹ IA Guidelines 2006, Part II, s 5, at 8.
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calculus. At the same time, that public policy judgment will often be
better made when it is informed by a careful structured comparison of
consequences, whether that is termed an analysis of ‘benefits and costs’ or
‘positive and negative impacts’. Simply choosing policy goals on unstated
or raw political criteria would be arbitrary, invite partisan volatility, and
lack transparency. At least some version of BCA offers a transparent
opportunity to evaluate and debate the reasons given. The key should be
this function of considering alternatives and consequences and giving
reasons for decisions, rather than quantification per se.
Here I suggest several institutional innovations that Europe could
pursue to make Better Regulation even better.

‘Warm Analysis’
Given its determination to use IA and BCA, Europe should employ what
I will call ‘Warm Analysis’. Along a spectrum from ‘hot’ to ‘cold’, one can
locate policy based on moral outrage at the hot end (imagine the crowd or
the politician who reacts intensely, often to a recent crisis or scandal,
expressing moralistic norms of sin, blame, and punishment, and giving
little or no attention to, or even opposing, analysis of wider consequences), and one can locate policy based on strict monetized BCA at the
end of cool or cold analysis (imagine the accountant wearing a green eye
shade who counts statistics, manages only what is measured, and maximizes wealth dispassionately).¹²⁰ ‘Warm analysis’ would occupy the center of this spectrum, embodying serious analysis of the full variety of
impacts and tradeoffs, some quantitative and some qualitative, with
compassion for both those who incur risks and those who incur abatement costs. As I will argue here, warm analysis can be understood as the
application of BCA to BCA—or optimal optimization—recognizing
¹²⁰ See Christopher H Schroeder, ‘Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law’, (1993) 35 William and Mary Law
Review 251, 253–8. Schroeder limits ‘cool analysis’ to self-interested utility maximization
in which risks are calculated as the ‘thin’ expected value of probability and harm. Two
aspects that Schroeder puts under the heading of ‘moral outrage’—the inclusion in an individual’s utility function of effects on others and on society as a whole, and the recognition
of ‘thick’ qualitative attributes of risk—do not seem to me to fit the notion of moral outrage, and would fit better under what I am calling ‘warm analysis’. By contrast, moral outrage at the hot end of the spectrum is characterized by an intense and moralist or absolutist
response focused on sin, blame, and prohibition, lacking (or even opposed to) analysis of
consequences, tradeoffs, and proportionality. Schroeder describes the moral outrage felt by
environmentalists who see pollution as a sin and compliance as an obligation; consider also
the moral outrage felt after a terrorist attack and the call for a ‘crusade’ of ‘shock and awe’
to strike back. See Stern and Wiener, n 66 above.
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that information and analysis are themselves costly (chiefly in delay) and
that omitting important effects is itself a costly error of analysis. Sensible
application of BCA requires applying it not only to regulatory policies
but also to the analytic review process itself. Hot moral outrage neglects
important impacts and tradeoffs, and is vulnerable to heuristic errors;
cold analysis applies monetized BCA to policies but neglects the costs of
delay and of omitting important but unquantified impacts. Warm analysis is thus more embracing than either hot or cold approaches, while
remaining truer to the core principle of BCA.
The crucial task for good public policy is to think through decisions.
It is therefore to engage in a structured consideration of the major
alternatives and consequences, in order to inform sound judgment
through reason. The crucial task is not just an accounting exercise, nor
strict economic optimization, though economic tools can be helpful. That
is the key reason that in EO 12866 we chose to use the term ‘justify’ in
place of ‘outweigh’, and to expressly allow consideration of non-quantified
impacts (while encouraging quantification). ‘Warm analysis’ compares
pros and cons in a structured decision framework but without limiting
the comparison to strictly quantified and monetized impacts.
This approach is the ‘prudential algebra’ recommended by Benjamin
Franklin in 1772:
In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I cannot
for want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if you please I
will tell you how. When those difficult Cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly
because while we have them under Consideration, all the Reasons pro and con are
not present to the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one Set present themselves, and at other times another, the first being out of Sight . . . . To get over this,
my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into two Columns; writing
over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during three or four Days
Consideration, I put down under the different heads short Hints of the different
Motives, that at different Times occur to me, for or against the Measure. When I
have thus got them all together in one View, I endeavour to estimate their respective Weights . . . and thus proceeding I find at length where the Ballance
lies . . . And, tho’ the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of
Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable
to make a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of
Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.¹²¹
¹²¹ Benjamin Franklin, ‘Letter to Joseph Priestley’, London, 19 September 1772, in
Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography and Notes,
Frank Luther Mott and Chester E. Jorgenson (eds) (New York: American Book Company,
1936), 348–9.
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Franklin describes a careful structured approach to ensuring that all the
important consequences are ‘on screen’,¹²² quantifying their weights as
much as possible but not insisting on algebraic precision, and coming to
a considered judgment about the best course of action. He emphasizes
that errors—‘rash Steps’—are principally due to omitting important reasons and not to quantifying each reason too little or too much. Similarly,
John Maynard Keynes remarked that ‘it is better to be roughly right than
precisely wrong’.¹²³ Cass Sunstein has advocated BCA as a cognitive
approach to informed decision-making rather than as a strictly numerical
calculus of optimization,¹²⁴ and Amartya Sen has advocated broadening
the types of impacts and valuations incorporated into BCA.¹²⁵ As quoted
above, the Mandelkern Group urged the use of ranges rather than point
estimates, to account for uncertainties in the forecasts of benefits and
costs—an insight borne out in the ex post studies of BCAs.
Warm Analysis is not a rejection of BCA using quantified, monetized
values. Indeed, BCA itself justifies the Warm Analysis approach. With
limited resources to analyze decisions, there is some tradeoff between
accuracy (getting the decision right) and precision (calculating exact
numbers), which suggests that on standard BCA criteria, it would often
do more to improve policy decisions to get the full set of consequences
before the decision-maker (so that ‘the whole lies before me’, in Franklin’s
words) than it would to invest in precisely quantifying only a few of those
consequences while neglecting others or unduly delaying the decision.
This is akin to the question of how much analysis is optimal: more analysis yields fewer policy errors, but also incurs costs in money and time
(delay), so one must compare the Value of Information (VOI) versus the
Cost of Information (COI). Such a BCA of BCA, or meta-BCA, shows
that it is better to assess the full consequences than to quantify precisely
just a few. A Cold Analysis that quantifies some impacts but omits other
recognized important impacts (or takes too long) is in effect assigning a
weight of zero to those omitted impacts, which is a greater error than
including them in a qualitative or partly quantified way.¹²⁶ If the cost
¹²² See Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk (Chicago: University of Chicago,
Press 1996).
¹²³ Quoted in Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, ‘Bias in the
Consumer Price Index’, Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, US House of
Representatives, 4 March 1997, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/testimony/
1997/19970304.htm.
¹²⁴ See Sunstein, n 100 above.
¹²⁵ See Amartya Sen, ‘The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, (2000) 29 J Legal Stud
931–52 (favoring BCA if it uses a broader set of values instead of only market valuations).
¹²⁶ Thus either inadequate comparison of benefits and costs (as espoused by critics of
BCA) or excessive quantification of a few benefits and costs (as undertaken in some BCAs)
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(including delay) of precisely quantifying all the impacts is lower than
its benefits, then full quantification is warranted. And this meta-BCA
suggests that, over time, as we find ways to quantify and monetize more
impacts—to reduce the COI or increase the VOI—more exacting analysis would be warranted. Our methods of quantification and valuation
are endogenous and should respond to the use of BCA, as qualified by
meta-BCA, to become ‘Warm Analysis’ by improving our ability to make
diverse impacts more understandable.¹²⁷
While the academic debate over BCA often pits advocates of Cool
Analysis against sharp critics who reject statistics and monetization without
clearly identifying a preferred alternative decision-making method (implying a preference for populist moral outrage), the practical reality is that the
approach to Warm Analysis that I am describing is already available, even
required, under the major legal requirements for BCA. In the US, EO
12866 expressly requires analysis of both qualitative and quantitative
factors, and calls on agencies to show that benefits ‘justify’ (not ‘outweigh’)
the costs. OMB/OIRA Circular A-4 requires attention to unquantified as
well as quantified impacts. CEQ guidelines on environmental IA require
assessment of impacts despite incomplete information. In the EU, the IA
Guidelines require analysis of ‘all positive and negative impacts’, with the
would threaten what Franklin called a ‘rash step’. In a similar vein, the late Allen Kneese—
an economist and advocate of using BCA in environmental policy—worried that overly
precise BCAs may ‘let method outrun content’. Kneese, n 63 above, at 60. Likewise, the
joint statement by eleven noted economists advocating BCA was careful to say that BCA
has an important role to play in helping inform regulatory decision-making, although it
should not be the sole basis for such decision-making, that agencies ‘should not be bound
by strict benefit-cost tests’, and that agencies should take into account uncertainties, ranges
of estimates, unquantified impacts, and distributional impacts. See Arrow et al, n 93 above.
¹²⁷ I do not propose to leave everything ‘blurry’, as one critic of BCA has urged, see Lisa
Heinzerling, ‘Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions’, (1999) 107 Yale LJ 1981, 2069.
My point is that a comprehensive Warm Analysis offers greater clarity than either a Cold
Analysis that omits important factors, or a non-BCA approach that omits important factors. Nor do I agree that a careful structured analysis of pros and cons lacking full quantification would be ‘vacuous’ (see Sunstein, n 100 above) or ‘vapid’ (see Driesen, n 96 above).
The key point is to get the decision-maker to consider the full portfolio of important
choices and consequences, see Margolis, n 122 above, Graham and Wiener, n 116 above.
This approach avoids the ‘false promise of determinacy’ that critics fear in strictly quantified BCA, see Amy Sinden, ‘Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals’,
(2004) 29 Colum J Envtl L 191, 194. At the same time, I am optimistic about the ability
to improve methods of analysis over time to quantify more kinds of impacts (especially
through investment in research and staff capacity, through greater demand for such analysis via initiatives such as Better Regulation, and through ex post evaluations to improve
ex ante methods, as discussed below). For another effort to find a ‘middle way between all or
nothing analytically’ that bears similarities to my version of ‘warm analysis’—yet authored
by a critic of quantitative analysis—see Richard Parker, ‘The Empirical Roots of the
Regulatory Reform Movement: A Critical Appraisal’, (2006) 58 Admin L Rev 359, 394–5.
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possibility of using formal BCA or C-EA where warranted.¹²⁸ (They do
not, however, set a goal of ‘maximizing net benefits’, as the US orders do; the
EU should consider adding this objective in its next updated IA
Guidelines.) And the EU IA Guidelines call for ‘Proportionate Analysis’, to
choose the degree of analysis warranted by the problem.¹²⁹
A particular question, to which little space can be devoted here,
is—given a decision to monetize valuations of impacts—what monetary
estimates should be used for the values of health, life, and environmental
impacts? Willingness-to-pay (or to accept) is a useful but imperfect proxy
for utility, limited by ability to pay and variations in marginal utility of
income, by market imperfections in mobility and information, and by
heuristic misperceptions of risk.¹³⁰ There is a lively controversy over
whether and how to adjust monetized values of the value of a life to
account for the expected years of life lost when risks occur at different
ages, or to account for different levels of income and associated demand
for risk protection. Using a single value of a statistical life (VSL) for all
premature deaths seems insensitive to the timing of the death occurring
early or late in life, as well as insensitive to other attributes of the risk that
people find more or less undesirable.¹³¹ But devising schedules of
¹²⁸ IA Guidelines 2005, updated 2006, at 39, Part III s 5.1 and n 45 and Annexes 12
and 13. As the EU moves from the hotter (less or non-)analytic side toward greater use
of IA and BCA, it may need to do more to quantify impacts and compare options rigorously. One of the leaders of the Better Regulation effort recently remarked: ‘I will also be
following with great interest the external evaluation of our Impact Assessment system
which will report next year and which should provide further input for improvements.
Without prejudging the results of the assessment, I personally believe that a more rigorous
quantification of the costs and benefits—economic, social and environmental—will be
very important. Only if we can demonstrate through hard data that the benefits of what we
propose outweigh the costs will we be fully convincing.’ Günter Verheugen, Vice-President
of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, Better Regulation
for Jobs and Growth, Former Members Dinner, European Parliament Former Members
Association, Brussels, 10 May 2006, SPEECH/06/287, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_barroso/verheugen/speeches/speeches_en.htm.
¹²⁹ IA Guidelines 2006, Part II, s 5, at 8. Similarly, ‘The depth and scope of the assessment respects the principle of proportionate analysis, i.e. more Impact Assessment
resources will be allocated to those proposals that can be expected to have the most significant impacts’. Communication of 16 March 2005, n 4 above, at 13. See also Renda, n 75
above, 92 (discussing the meanings of proportionality in regulatory standards and proportionate analysis in the IA process).
¹³⁰ See Ezra J Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Informal Introduction (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1971; 4th edn, Routledge, 1994); Sunstein, n 100 above; Jonathan B Wiener,
‘Risk in the Republic’, (1997) 8 Duke Envtl Law & Policy F 1–21; Matthew D Adler and
Eric A. Posner, ‘Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Preferences are Distorted’,
(2000) 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1146.
¹³¹ See Cass R Sunstein, ‘Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation’, (2004) 54 Duke
LJ 385; George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Robert Fabian (eds), Valuing Health for Policy:
An Economic Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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different VSL or value of a statistical life-year (VSLY) for different risks,
populations, and ages is criticized as unfair and even as inconsistent with
willingness to pay.¹³² Here, I simply point out that the US and Europe are
already using monetized VSL figures in regulatory IAs, but not the same
figures: the US uses a range of figures clustered around $3 to $6 million per
VSL saved,¹³³ whereas Europe is using numbers closer to $1.5 million.¹³⁴
This implies that the US puts greater value than does Europe on preventing health risks—an observation contrary to the conventional wisdom of
greater European concern about such risks. Whether that difference
is due to the income elasticity of demand for risk prevention, or to other
factors,¹³⁵ it deserves greater attention—as does the fact that the US now
¹³² Using the same VSL for all deaths appears to treat all victims alike, but it also values
younger victims’ remaining years of life at less per year than older victims’ remaining years
of life. On the other hand, using a simple VSLY (ie the VSL divided by years of average life
expectancy at birth), which values each year the same regardless of age (and hence values
younger victims more than older victims), is inconsistent with WTP if people put different values on different times of life, and in particular if they value the last few years of life
(scarce time) more highly than earlier years. See W Kip Viscusi, ‘Regulation of Health,
Safety and Environmental Risks’, NBER Working Paper 11934 (January 2006), at 46–49,
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11934 Laura J Lowenstein and Richard L
Revesz, ‘Anti-Regulation under the Guise of Rational Regulation: The Bush
Administration’s Approaches to Valuing Human Lives in Environmental Cost-Benefit
Analyses’, (2004) 34 Environmental Law Reporter 109–54. The Lowenstein and Revesz
article criticizes OIRA for undervaluing older people, but in fact it was EPA during the
Clinton administration that began doing so (based on studies in the UK and Canada) and
it was OIRA in 2003 that instructed EPA and other agencies not to use a crude ‘senior discount’ nor a simple VSLY approach, see John D Graham, ‘Memorandum on Benefit-Cost
Analysis and Lifesaving Rules’, 30 May 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/pmc_benefit_cost_memo.pdf (noting that saving ten years of life is more
valuable than saving one year of life, but not ten times more valuable). Studies to date suggest that total VSL decreases in older age, but less than proportionately, so that VSLY is
increasing in older age, although with little overall impact on benefits valuation, see
Viscusi, n 58 above, at 14–17, 30–1.
¹³³ See Sunstein, n 131 above, table 1, at 396–8 ($1.5 to $6.5 million); Lisa Robinson,
background paper for National Academy of Sciences/Institute of Medicine, Current
Federal Agency Practices for Valuing the Impact of Regulations on Health and Safety
(2004) ($1 m–$8 m).
¹³⁴ Presentation by Matti Vainio, DG Environment, European Commission, ‘Impact
Assessment of Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution’, at the US–EU High Level Regulatory
Cooperation Forum (25 January 2006), powerpoint slide 27. In November 2000 the
European Commission had issued ‘Recommended Interim Values for the Value of
Preventing a Fatality in DG Environment Cost Benefit Analysis’, at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/others/recommended_interim_values.pdf (from a
workshop at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/others/value_of_life.htm),
recommending that the VSL be 1 to 1.5 million euros, with a range from 0.65 to 2.5 million
euros.
¹³⁵ On variation in the VSL across countries, see Sunstein, n 131 above, at 415; W Kip
Viscusi and Joe Aldy, ‘The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates
throughout the World’, (2003) 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5.
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uses discount rates of 7 and 3 percent (or even lower for long-term
intergenerational effects), while the EU Guidelines require a discount
rate of 4 percent.¹³⁶ These and other differences could serve as the point
of departure for a wider comparative review of US and EU approaches to
monetizing in BCA and to Cool versus Warm Analysis in general.

Using BCA to say ‘Yes’ as well as ‘No’
The second institutional innovation Europe should pursue is to use RIA
and BCA evenhandedly, not only to say ‘No’ to the Bad (ie reject or
‘return’ regulation proposed by agencies), but also to say ‘Yes’ to the Good
(ie ‘prompt’ new regulation). This is especially apt in the EU, where the
European Commission initiates legislation, so it could use BCA to identify the best new policies to pursue—even more directly than can the
White House in the US system, because the US Presidency is so often
reacting to Congressional legislation and to agencies’ implementing
regulations. But it is also highly important in the US, where RIA and
BCA have traditionally been positioned as a one-way ‘No’ check by the
Presidency on the tide of lawmaking by the Congress and concomitant
regulating by the agencies. It is this institutional posture, more than any
analytic bias, that puts BCA in the position cited by critics¹³⁷ of being
used more often to restrain regulation than to promote it. That posture
erodes the credibility of BCA; a more evenhanded posture is needed that
uses BCA to maximize net benefits by both adding and subtracting regulations as warranted. There are good reasons to think that, even as some
proposed regulations would yield benefits that do not justify their costs
and should be revised or rejected, there are other regulations that agencies
are not proposing that would increase net benefits—such as health and
environmental regulations that would yield broadly diffuse benefits but
concentrated costs.¹³⁸ To fill this institutional gap, in the last five years,
OMB/OIRA has adopted the pathbreaking innovation of ‘prompt letters’ to urge agencies to consider adopting new regulations that look
attractive on BCA criteria. Such evenhanded application of BCA would
increase net benefits, while incidentally shoring up the credibility of
BCA. The US should develop a more routine approach to identifying
¹³⁶ IA Guidelines 2006, Annex 12 (adding in footnote 45 that ‘This rate broadly corresponds to the average real yield on longer-term government debt in the EU over a period
since the early 1980s’.).
¹³⁷ Eg Driesen, n 96 above; Bagley and Revesz, n 107 above.
¹³⁸ This is indeed a standard prediction of public choice theory. See William N
Eskridge, Jr, ‘Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation’ (1988) 74 Va L Rev 275.
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promising subjects for prompt letters, such as by issuing an annual
request for proposed prompt letters (as a counterpart to OIRA’s annual
request for burden-reducing proposals), by assigning one or more OIRA
staff to identify and develop prompt letters, and by including prompt
letters more explicitly in the next revision of the Executive Order.¹³⁹
Europe, too, should also develop this kind of an evenhanded approach to
IA and BCA.

Wider Application
Third, IA and BCA should be applied more widely, not just to health and
environmental rules but also to other important policies, such as trade
measures, forest management, projects such as dams and highways, and
homeland security and counterterrorism. As discussed in detail above,
BCA was initially applied to many of these topics, but no longer is, or is
not adequately conducted. Broadening its application would, in many of
these domains, position BCA institutionally on the side of health and
environmental protection—and as a more powerful tool than environmental groups have often had in these arenas to date. Combined with the
continued application of BCA to regulations, this broadened role for
BCA would help achieve the more neutral posture to which it aspires,
while also bringing more sensible policy results in each domain.¹⁴⁰
BCA should be used not only to limit costs, but also to increase net benefits. That is the explicit instruction of EO 12866. Thus, if BCA indicates
that a regulation should be made more stringent than proposed, that finding should be on the same footing as a BCA in another case indicating
that less stringent regulation would be preferable. BCA should correct
both over- and under-regulation. And BCA should be applied to deregulation as well as to new regulation.¹⁴¹ There is no reason to assume in the
abstract that every deregulatory move will reduce costs more than benefits; that question should be subject to BCA.
Applying BCA to legislation would be more straightforward in the
EU (where the European Commission initiates legislation and is also
committed to IA), than in the US (where Congress initiates legislation
but is not committed to IA—unless the Congress itself would take seriously the proposals to establish a BCA process and review office, such as
¹³⁹ See Bagley and Revesz, n 107 above.
¹⁴⁰ See Robert W Hahn and Cass R Sunstein, ‘A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis’, (2002) 150 U Pa L Rev
1489, 1499 (advocating broader use of BCA to render it a more neutral tool).
¹⁴¹ See OMB Circular A-4, n 55 above, at 1 (covering both regulation and deregulation).
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in the General Accountability Office or the Congressional Budget Office,
and listen to the analyses produced by that office).

Optimal Analysis
Fourth, the meta-BCA idea should be incorporated in an institutional
mechanism. Where BCA remains highly contested, its application
should be based on its own pros and cons (judged by the implementing
agency, subject to executive branch review), rather than mandated or prohibited by law. In US law, EO 12866 and Circular A-4 already give some
discretion to agencies to tailor the type of BCA or C-EA to the regulatory
matter in question. Going further, Congress could enact a ‘superauthorization’ to authorize (but not mandate) agencies to use BCA or C-EA or
other analytic techniques where optimal, notwithstanding prohibitions
(or requirements) in existing individual laws.¹⁴² In EU law, the European
Commission should develop a regular system to animate its ‘proportionate analysis’ criterion through routine, considered selection of the optimal
type and degree of analysis for each major policy initiative.

Multiple Risks
As it constructs its program of Impact Assessment, the EU can tackle a difficult but inescapable problem that risk regulators have not yet fully
addressed: the phenomenon of multiple risks. Government agencies and
scientists typically assess the risk of one chemical or technology at a time.¹⁴³
For the most part, agencies regulate one risk at a time.¹⁴⁴ Many individual
risks have thereby been reduced. But increasing recognition of the interconnectedness among multiple risks poses new demands, including the
need to forecast the joint effects of simultaneous exposure to multiple risks,
and to analyze the full portfolio effects, including ancillary benefits (AB)
and countervailing risks (CR), of any effort to reduce a target risk.
One reason for the single-risk approach is that the cost of information
(COI) increases as the problem becomes more complex. Another is
institutional fragmentation—dividing up problems into smaller pieces to
be addressed by different government bodies—which is the logical result
¹⁴² See Jonathan B Wiener, Testimony on Regulatory Reform Legislation before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 1995.
¹⁴³ International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), A Framework for Cumulative
Risk Assessment, ILSI Risk Science Institute Workshop Report 5 (1999), available at
http://rsi.ilsi.org/file/rsiframrpt.pdf (visited 10 September 2003) (‘Traditionally, these
risk assessments have been conducted on individual chemicals medium by medium; however, humans are exposed to multiple chemicals by multiple routes concurrently in daily life’).
¹⁴⁴ See J Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United States:
Evaluating the System (Washington, DC: RFF Press, 1999).
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of special interest politics, legislators’ credit-claiming, and specialization
in governance. Such specialization can be desirable, and some degree
of specialization is inevitable because a monolithic government entity
could not handle all issues at once (and would raise other concerns about
concentration of power). But fragmentation can also yield problems
when issues are interconnected. Fragmentation into specialized agencies
with narrow missions exacerbates the inattention to risk-risk tradeoffs, by
causing spillover effects into the domains of other agencies (eg the EPA
asbestos ban yielding weaker brake linings and hence increased highway
accidents, or EPA limits on air toxics emissions yielding increased exposures to workers inside factories). Even within an agency’s own domain,
these tradeoffs can occur (eg NHTSA requiring higher fuel efficiency
levels without assessing vehicle safety, or requiring airbags without assessing injuries to children; or the Iraq war plans addressing cost—albeit
underestimated—but omitting the countervailing risks of collateral damage, blowback, theft, degraded combat readiness, and distraction from
other threats). Actions by one government entity can impose spillover
effects on others—‘regulatory externalities’. Some version of coordination or integration is therefore needed.
The real world is one of interconnection and complexity, in which
people and ecosystems are exposed to multiple risks at the same time.
Naturalist John Muir famously remarked in 1869 that ‘when we try to
pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the
universe’.¹⁴⁵ The modern science of ecotoxicology is moving to formalize
that insight in models of simultaneous ‘multiple stressors’.¹⁴⁶ Modern
legal scholars see the same thing: ‘It only takes a moment’s reflection to see
that multiple-risk situations are quite common’.¹⁴⁷ ‘Most of today’s
environmental law violates basic principles of ecology. Nature teaches the
connectedness of all activities, but most current-generation law regulates
separate pollutants with little consideration of ecosystems as a whole.’¹⁴⁸
¹⁴⁵ John Muir, My First Summer in the Sierra (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988),
110 (journal entry for 27 July 1869).
¹⁴⁶ See Nico M Van Straalen, ‘Ecotoxicology Becomes Stress Ecology’ (1 September
2003) Envtl Sci & Tech 325A; JA Foran and SA Ferenc (eds), Multiple Stressors in
Ecological Risk and Impact Assessment (Pensacola, Fla: Society of Environmental Toxicology
and Chemistry (SETAC) Press, 1999); SA Ferenc and JA Foran (eds), Multiple Stressors in
Ecological Risk and Impact Assessment: Approach to Risk Estimation (Pensacola, Fla: SETAC
Press, 2000).
¹⁴⁷ Mark Grady, Book Review, ‘Discontinuities and Information Burdens’, reviewing
William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987), 56 Geo
Wash L Rev 658, 664 (1988).
¹⁴⁸ E Donald Elliot, ‘Toward Ecological Law and Policy’, in Marion R Chertow and
Daniel C Esty, (eds)., Thinking Ecologically (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

Better Regulation

493

The multirisk world poses challenges for risk assessment. First, risk
assessors should develop the means to forecast the joint effects of simultaneous exposure to multiple risks. The joint effect may be synergistic
(supralinear), linear (additive), or offsetting (subtractive), but the key
point is that it is the joint effect rather than the sum of the individual
effects that must be forecast. Second, increasing interconnections may
accelerate the transmission of risks (such as disease or terrorism) across
countries and continents, through increasingly dense networks among
ecological, trade, travel, and telecommunications systems (including the
internet). Risk assessment needs to account for these propagation vectors.
Third, rather than simply forecasting single variables (such as exposure
to a chemical), risk assessors need to develop multiple scenarios incorporating the mix of multiple variables affecting risk, weighted by probability judgments and sensitivity analyses.¹⁴⁹ US OMB Circular A-4
(September 2003) now requires a formal probabilistic portfolio of scenarios for policies with impacts exceeding $1 billion.
The multirisk world also challenges risk management. In theory, BCA
embraces all effects. But in practice, BCA is often limited to looking only at
the reduction in the target risk (TR) versus the increase in industry compliance cost. The problem is that risk-risk tradeoffs—the phenomenon that
efforts to reduce a target risk may induce new countervailing risks¹⁵⁰—are
thereby ignored. The focus on TR omits countervailing and ancillary
effects. And the focus on industry compliance cost favors options in which
the cost of shifting from a restricted product or activity to a new substitute
is low; but these substitutes can pose their own countervailing risks.
The solution is a full portfolio analysis (to ‘treat the whole patient’
rather than focusing on one risk or symptom at a time) that applies BCA
more broadly, to maximize overall risk reduction (including countervailing risks (CR) and ancillary benefits (AB), as well as target risk (TR)
reductions) less overall social costs (c, including administrative costs,
compliance costs, and foregone innovation).¹⁵¹ Thus risk-risk tradeoff
¹⁴⁹ Kahn and Wiener, n 23 above; de Jouvenel, n 23 above; Stephen Schneider, ‘Can We
Estimate the likelihood of Climatic Changes at 2100? An Editorial Comment’, (2002) 52
Climatic Change 441–51 (criticizing single-scenario forecasts and calling for probabilityweighted portfolios of scenarios).
¹⁵⁰ See Graham and Wiener, n 116 above.
¹⁵¹ A short version is: max(TR – CR  AB – C). See Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Managing
the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management’, (1998) 9 Risk: Health Safety Environment
39–82. Equal attention to ancillary benefits (as well as countervailing risks) is urged by
Samuel J Rascoff and Richard L Revesz, ‘The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards
Parity in Regulatory Policy’ (2002) 69 U Chi L Rev 1763. I agree, as we stated expressly in
Grahan and Wiener above n 116, at 2, 37, 232. Indeed several of the examples of ABs
offered by Rascoff and Revesz are the same examples we cited in ibid. No normative bias was
intended; the goal should be an evaluation of the full portfolio of consequences.
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analysis needs to be made an explicit part of BCA (or conducted on its
own where BCA is prohibited or otherwise not used). Even opponents of
BCA agree that these risk-risk tradeoffs deserve analysis.¹⁵²
EO 12866 expressly requires consideration of adverse health and
environmental impacts in section 6. OMB/OIRA’s Circular A-4 (2003)
contains narrative instructions to perform risk-risk tradeoff analysis,
although the table it attaches as a scorecard to guide agency calculations
does not contain a line on which risk-risk impacts (countervailing or
ancillary effects) are to be entered.¹⁵³
The EU IA Guidelines simply say: ‘Identify (direct and indirect)
environmental, economic and social impacts and how they occur’.¹⁵⁴
They should pay closer attention to countervailing risks and ancillary
benefits, because these factors are so often neglected in the IA process.
The phenomenon of multiple risks underscores the need for Integrated
Impacts Assessment—not different IA requirements segmented into particular topics. In the US the RIA is an integrated IA, but there are also specialized IAs on environment, federalism, takings, small business, children,
and others. OMB Circular A-4 encourages agencies to combine these into
one document. In the EU there is one Integrated IA on economic, social,
and environmental impacts (but there is also talk of creating a special IA on
¹⁵² Thomas O McGarity, ‘A Cost-Benefit State’ (1998) 50 Admin L Rev 7, 40–2
(‘There is a grain of truth in the proposition that single-minded regulation of some health
and safety risks can increase others. For example, when the Consumer Product Safety
Commission promulgated a flammability standard for children’s sleepwear, some manufacturers responded by treating the sleepwear with the chemical TRIS, which was later
found to be carcinogenic. Health and safety agencies should take care not to create more
risks than they eliminate. To the extent feasible, agencies should address ancillary risks that
flow in a direct causal sequence from the conduct required or induced by their regulations.
[Internal footnote: All of the risk-risk tradeoffs described in the case studies of the recent
book, Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment, are of this variety].
Agencies should also coordinate regulatory initiatives with other agencies to ensure that
one agency’s regulation does not unduly increase risks within another agency’s domain.’)
¹⁵³ Other approaches do not achieve this full portfolio analysis. For example, ‘incomerisk’ (‘health-health’) analysis translates costs into risk units by estimating the amount of
household income reduction (due to regulatory cost) associated with a death (due to
reduced household expenditures on health). This in effect ‘riskizes’ costs, instead of the
standard practice of ‘monetizing’ health risks, to achieve a common numeraire; but it does
not address the risk-risk phenomena of CR or AB, which are additional effects apart from
regulatory costs. ‘Precaution’ typically looks only at TR and ignores CR and C (although
the European Commission’s Communication calls for attention to C). A focus on
‘Administrative Costs’ (‘red tape’) is only a subset of C, and reducing Administrative Costs
could increase social costs, for example if a good BCA would necessitate some administrative costs, or if requiring industry to do more paperwork for information disclosure would
save lives.
¹⁵⁴ IA Guidelines 2006, at 26.
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competitiveness). The Commission’s Communication of 16 March 2005
(at 13) remarks:
Impact Assessment system was introduced to integrate and replace all previous
single-sector assessments, as un-integrated analyses had been found to have little
effect on the quality of policy-making. It requires the Commission to systematically assess, on an equal basis, the likely economic (including competitiveness),
environmental and social implications of its proposals and to highlight the
potential trade-offs. This new impact assessment system aims at helping the
Commission to improve the quality and transparency of its proposals and to
identify balanced solutions consistent with Community policy objectives.

Beyond risk-risk analysis in policy development, there should be networks
of notification across agencies of cross-domain side effects. In the US, EPA
now notifies OSHA when air toxics regulations may induce employers to
stop exterior emissions by sealing the factory, thereby trapping toxics
inside the workplace. But this was agreed only after OSHA complained,
and there is still no government-wide process for such notifications across
all agencies. The EU has a process of ‘Interservice Consultation’,¹⁵⁵ but it
is not yet clear whether it will address the problem of cross-domain regulatory externality, or act as a more general invitation to comment on
others’ proposals.
At the legislative level, a key move is toward methods of Integrated
Pollution Control.¹⁵⁶ In the 1990s, the United Kingdom made significant
efforts to adopt IPC, in its 1990 and 1995 Environmental Protection Acts
and its creation of an integrated pollution control agency.¹⁵⁷ The EU and
other countries have considered borrowing the IPC.¹⁵⁸ In the US, this
¹⁵⁵ IA Guidelines, updated 15 March 2006, Part II, s 7, at 9–12.
¹⁵⁶ Lakshman Guruswamy, ‘The Case for Integrated Pollution Control’ (Autumn
1991) 54 Law & Contemp Probs 41; Nigel Haigh and Irene Erwin (eds), Integrated
Pollution Control (Washington, DC: The Conservation Foundation and the Institute for
European Environmental Policy, 1990).
¹⁵⁷ Richard Macrory, ‘Integrated Prevention and Pollution Control: The UK Experience’
in C Backes and G Betlem (eds), Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (The Hague:
Kluwer International, 1991) 53–64; Albert Weale, ‘Environmental Regulation and
Administrative Reform in Britain’ in Giandomenico Majone (ed). Regulating Europe
(London: Rountledge, 1996) 106; Michael Purdue, ‘Integrated Pollution Control in the
Environmental Protection Act 1990: A Coming of Age of Environmental Law?’ (1991) 54
Mod L Rev 534; Neil Carter and Philip Lowe, ‘The Establishment of a Cross-Sector
Environment Agency’ in T Gray (ed), UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s (New York:
St Martin’s Press,1995) 38.
¹⁵⁸ See Chris Backes and Gerrit Betlem (eds), Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control: The EC Directive from a Comparative Legal and Economic Perspective (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1999); Johannes Zöttl, ‘Towards Integrated Protection of the
Environment in Germany?’ (2000) 12 J Envtl L 281.
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may require statutory changes to enable, for example, EPA’s program
offices for air, water, and waste to develop joint multimedia regulations,
or several agencies to collaborate. Ultimately, the numerous narrowly
targeted statutes could be combined into a Comprehensive Environment
(or Risk) Act that integrates regulatory standards and instruments while
ensuring attention to multiple risks.
The EU concept of ‘Interservice Steering Groups’ is also promising.¹⁵⁹
Similarly, the US White House often fosters interagency collaboration.
Interagency teams assembled to deal with shared or spillover problems
connect the matrix by linking horizontally across the set of vertically
isolated government silos.
More aggressively, one could pursue structural integration. This could
include merger of related agencies, to internalize cross-domain regulatory
externalities. For example, in the United States, EPA (Environmental
Protection Agency) and OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
Administration) might be merged, or those two might be combined
into a new Risk Department along with others such as the CPSC
(Consumer Product Safety Commission), NHTSA (National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration), the aviation safety branch of FAA
(Federal Aviation Authority) (now partly of TSA, the Transportation
Security Administration), and the food safety branch of the FDA. Land
and resource management agencies such as the Forest Service, National
Park Service, BLM (Bureau of Land Management), FWS (Fish and
Wildlife Service), and NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service) could
also be merged into an integrated resource conservation agency. In the
EU, one can imagine combining DG (Directorates General) such as DG
Environment and DG SANCO (Health and Consumer Affairs). But
all these mergers would only be worthwhile if they improved decisionmaking on complex multirisk problems. They would yield little if the
statutory authority to regulate were not also revised, or if the cultures of
the pre-existing units remained so balkanized that they continued to regulate without regard for their effects on each other. Merged agencies may
continue to operate with fragmented internal structures (as EPA’s different program offices are fragmented despite the integrationist agenda for
¹⁵⁹ IA Guidelines, updated 15 March 2006, Part II, s 6, at 9 (‘An Inter-Service Steering
Group is compulsory for all items of a cross-cutting nature. The Roadmap asks DGs to
provide valid justification in those instances when no Inter-Service Steering Group is
envisaged. These groups are there to provide specialised inputs and to bring a wider perspective to the process. Involving other DGs from the early stages will also make it easier to
reach agreement during the Inter-Service Consultation’).
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founding EPA). The recent merger of several US agencies into the new
Department of Homeland Security offers an opportunity to study and
learn from a mega-merger of risk regulatory agencies. In addition to the
concern that mergers may mean greater centralization of power, there is
also the concern that more centralized management could be more rigid
even as a multirisk world demands more agile and creative policymaking.
All things considered, merger of agencies seems not as urgent as inculcating a multirisk approach in each agency.
Finally, the White House and the European Commission could each
create a Primary Risk Manager to help coordinate risk regulation across
the government.¹⁶⁰ Like a primary care physician who monitors the
whole patient but refers more serious ailments to specialists, the primary
risk manager would dispatch specific problems to expert agencies while
supervising and monitoring the whole. The primary risk manager could
help coordinate responses to multiple simultaneous risks, and ensure
attention to ancillary effects that cross agency jurisdictions. It could also
ensure within-agency consideration of ancillary effects.
One point here is that Better Regulation of multiple interconnected
risks can imply the need for more, not less regulation—for more comprehensive regulation to avoid perverse shifts (induced regulatory externalities). That is, when narrow regulation creates countervailing risks, rather
than regulate the target risk less, the optimal strategy may be to adopt
more embracing regulation that internalizes both the market externality
(target risk) and the regulatory externality (countervailing risk). Such
comprehensive approaches can also be less costly than the sum of separate
regulations for each risk. For example, if regulating CO2 alone induces
perverse shifts to emissions of methane (CH4) that increase net global
warming, the optimal solution might be to regulate both in a comprehensive multigas approach—both more protective and less costly.¹⁶¹

Administrative Simplification
The leading phalanx of Better Regulation in European member states is
currently the campaign to reduce administrative costs and adopt simplification measures. For example, the Netherlands developed the standard
¹⁶⁰ Graham and Wiener, n 116 above ch 11.
¹⁶¹ See Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Protecting the Global Environment’ in ibid, ch 10;
Richard B Stewart and Jonathan B Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy (Washington,
DC: AEI Press, 2003).
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cost model to measure administrative costs, the UK is cutting red tape,
the Merkel government in Germany is scaling back bureaucracy, and
France hosted a June 2006 conference on administrative simplification.
The EU has programs on administrative cost reduction and simplification. The OECD has developed a red tape scoreboard and is conducting
a pilot exercise in the road freight transport sector.
Administrative costs are the costs of furnishing information and of
processing government functions. Reducing administrative costs can
be pursued both ex ante (in review of proposed new regulations and
information requirements) and ex post (to reduce the costs of existing
programs). ‘Simplification’ entails combining, codifying, or repealing old
laws, in order to make them easier to understand, to reduce the complexity of bureaucratic steps the public must navigate, and to remove obsolete
provisions.
Administrative cost reduction and simplification can be highly desirable, especially in legal systems encumbered with outdated and uncodified
rules and a labyrinth of bureaucracy. But administrative cost reduction
and simplification pursued narrowly could be counterproductive. They
need to be evaluated in terms of their full social costs and benefits.

Administrative Costs
Reducing administrative costs can be one important way to remove barriers to business activities, facilitate new business startups, and diminish
the hassles and intrusions faced by individuals. In Europe, the standard
cost model (SCM) is being applied to measure and reduce paperwork
burdens and time consumption due to information demands imposed
on businesses and individuals by regulation. The Netherlands pioneered
the SCM in 2002, and there is now an SCM Network involving at least
nine EU member states.¹⁶² Further, European governments are setting
political targets, such as a 20 or 25 percent reduction in administrative
costs from a base level estimated by the SCM inventory.¹⁶³ European
member states face both national (member state) and EU administrative
¹⁶² See the SCM Network website at http://www.administrative-burdens.com/.
A brief discussion of progress to date is in European Commission, Communication from
the Commission on an EU common methodology for assessing administrative costs
imposed by legislation, SEC(2005)1329, COM(2005) 518 final (Brussels, 21 October
2005), at 4.
¹⁶³ See examples at the SCM Network website, n 162 above. For example, on 27 April
2006, Austria set a target of reducing administrative costs by 25 percent by 2010 using the
SCM, see http://www.administrative-burdens.com/default.asp?page1&article69.
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requirements, but reducing the latter may increase the former.¹⁶⁴ The
European Commission has developed a common methodology for measuring administrative burden¹⁶⁵ and is undertaking a pilot project to
measure administrative costs in industry sectors (initially construction,
with others to be added next year) across Europe. In May 2006, European
Commission Vice President Günter Verheugen announced the EU’s
own 25 percent target to reduce administrative costs, to be achieved in
partnership with the member states’ own cost reduction programs.¹⁶⁶
In the US, the Paperwork Reduction Acts of 1980 and 1995, and
OMB Circular A-130,¹⁶⁷ established the objective and methods of
cutting administrative costs. OMB measures the time spent by businesses
¹⁶⁴ The Commission pointed out: ‘Administrative obligations should therefore not be
presented as mere “red tape”, a term normally reserved for needlessly time-consuming,
excessively complicated or useless procedures. Nor should EU administrative obligations
be presented as a mere cost factor, as it often replaces 25 different national legislations and
thus decreases operating costs at EU level’. European Commission, Communication from
the Commission on an EU common methodology for assessing administrative costs
imposed by legislation, SEC(2005)1329, COM(2005) 518 final (Brussels, 21 October
2005), at 2 (footnote omitted).
¹⁶⁵ See IA Guidelines 2006, Annex 10 (on administrative cost measurement);
European Commission, Communication from the Commission on an EU common
methodology for assessing administrative costs imposed by legislation, SEC(2005)1329,
COM(2005) 518 final (Brussels, 21 October 2005).
¹⁶⁶ He said: ‘I believe that we should give particular attention to the administrative costs
of regulation since these costs can be cut without affecting the objectives of the legislation
itself. They are the proverbial “low hanging fruit” of our Better Regulation agenda. And they
are the major irritants European citizens and businesses are confronted with in their daily
lives. Crucially, work done by several Member States, notably the Netherlands, suggests that
both these costs and the potential for reducing them are very significant. If these estimates are
correct, Europe is spending more than 2.5% of its GDP—or some 275 billion euros every
year—on reporting requirements and other administrative obligations linked to our regulatory system. Moreover, these costs fall disproportionally on small and medium sized enterprises—the job engine of the European economy. This is patently absurd at a time that we are
putting competitiveness at the heart of our policy agenda. I am, therefore, of the opinion that
we should look at cutting these costs by 25% and I will take a proposal to the Commission
suggesting how this objective can be achieved. To lay the foundations for this proposal, I have
instructed my services to launch the necessary studies, which will provide a baseline against
which we can measure administrative costs, as soon as possible. . . . There will . . . have to be
a shared responsibility for reaching the 25% objective. I am optimistic that we can achieve
this partnership since 17 Member States have already announced administrative cost reduction measures in their Lisbon National Reform Programmes. Through the newly created
High Level Group on Better Regulation we are working closely with experts from all the
Member States to prepare this ambitious project’. Günter Verheugen, Vice President of the
European Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, Better Regulation for Jobs
and Growth, Former Members Dinner, European Parliament Former Members Association,
Brussels, 10 May 2006, SPEECH/06/287, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_
barroso/verheugen/speeches/speeches_en.htm.
¹⁶⁷ 44 USC s 35; OMB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information
Resources, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.html.
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and individuals in filling out each form, works to reduce that time, and
requires new surveys and other information-gathering projects to receive
OIRA approval. But OIRA has gone beyond that task—as directed
by EOs 12291 and 12866—to assess the full social costs and benefits of
policies.
Better Regulation should address administrative costs, but should not
focus solely or predominantly on administrative costs. ‘Cutting red tape’ is
popular, but does not assess the full costs or benefits of a policy. The political targets of 20 or 25 percent reductions in administrative costs are like
Procrustes’ insistence that guests be cropped to fit his bed: these targets
arbitrarily crop information-based programs without considering the
benefits of such information collection or the other costs that might
increase if information collection is curtailed. Even granting that administrative costs are too high in many countries, the 20 or 25 percent reduction targets have not been based on an analysis of the optimal reduction
in such costs. In some countries or sectors the optimal reduction in
administrative costs might be greater than 25 percent; in others it might
be less than a 20 percent reduction, or even an increase in administrative
costs if gathering new information would yield net benefits.
Focusing exclusively on cutting administrative costs could be perverse.
It could forfeit the large social benefits of some information disclosure
programs, such as the US Toxics Release Inventory¹⁶⁸ and similar
European pollutant discharge registries.¹⁶⁹ Cutting administrative costs
could be accomplished by swiftly adopting highly precautionary regulations, based on little information or analysis, that impose high social costs
in foregone innovation. Administrative costs could also be cut by eschewing the information demands of BCA and proceeding to adopt regulations that impose lower administrative costs but greater social costs.¹⁷⁰
¹⁶⁸ See James T Hamilton, Regulation through Revelation: The Origin, Politics and
Impacts of the Toxics Release Inventory Program (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
¹⁶⁹ See Peter H Sand, ‘Information Disclosure’ (2003) 63 Heidelberg Journal of
International Law (Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht) 487–502
(revised as Peter H Sand, ‘Information Disclosure and the Atlantic Divide’ in Jonathan
B Wiener et al (eds), The Reality of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United
States and Europe (forthcoming 2006) ).
¹⁷⁰ Consider these four hypothetical policies and their associated costs and benefits:
Policy A: Admin cost 10, Full cost 13, Benefit 20. Net Benefit  7.
Policy B: Admin cost 7, Full cost 10, Benefit 19. Net Benefit  9.
Policy C: Admin cost 4, Full cost 7, Benefit 12. Net Benefit  5.
Policy D: Admin cost 2, Full cost 16, Benefit 10. Net Benefit  6.
To reduce administrative costs alone, one would prefer option D. To reduce full costs
alone: prefer C. To maximize benefits alone: prefer A. To maximize net benefits: prefer B.
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Vice President Verheugen’s remarks (just quoted) express optimism that
administrative costs ‘can be cut without affecting the objectives of the
legislation itself ’, but in many cases administrative costs support valuable
information collection efforts that are necessary for policies to yield
benefits or reduce other costs. The 20 or 25 percent targets to reduce
administrative costs do not appear to take these benefits and other savings
into account.
To reduce administrative costs while avoiding these potentially counterproductive results, rather than simply setting targets to cut administrative costs alone, European Union institutions and member states should
use IA and BCA to assess the full social costs and benefits of policy
changes to reduce administrative costs. This point was recently recognized by the European Commission: On 15 March 2006 the Commission
inserted a warning to this effect, as a new ‘Box 11’ in the updated version
of the IA Guidelines. Box 11 now reads:
The fact that one option would impose lower administrative costs is not in itself
a sufficient reason to prefer it. For example, a measure . . . likely to impose relatively fewer administrative costs [by mandating specific technical standards,
instead of requiring labels that disclose product data] . . . could give manufacturers less flexibility and could reduce consumer choice, [so that] its overall costs
may be higher than the ‘administrative’ requirement to display data . . . ¹⁷¹

This Box 11 was not present in the June 2005 IA Guidelines. Its addition
in the updated 2006 Guidelines indicates that the Commission is
responding to the zeal for cutting red tape and tempering that zeal with
attention to full costs.¹⁷² The Commission should now go further to add
explicit consideration of benefits as well as costs, and should address this
issue in the member states as well.

Simplification
The EU and several member states have also embarked on ambitious
programs of simplification. In October 2005 the European Commission
announced ‘a three year programme to simplify the existing thousands
of pages of EU legislation (“acquis”) adopted since 1957’, including a
¹⁷¹ See EU IA Guidelines 2006, Part III, s 5.1, at 39, Box 11.
¹⁷² As the Commission remarked, ‘Regulatory costs, of which administrative obligations are just one element, must be analysed in a broad context, encompassing the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of regulation’. European Commission,
Communication from the Commission on an EU common methodology for assessing
administrative costs imposed by legislation, SEC(2005)1329, COM(2005) 518 final
(Brussels, 21 October 2005), at 3.
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proposal ‘to repeal, codify, recast or modify 222 basic legislations and over
1,400 related legal acts in the next three years’ and ‘to tackle administrative burden, especially for small business, by simplifying cumbersome
statistics form-filling or by modernizing the customs code to facilitate
electronic exchange of information’.¹⁷³ The Communication issued to
launch this policy outlined each of these strategies (repeal, codify, recast,
modify), as well as efforts to make greater use of information technology,
to use performance standards instead of technical design standards, and
to replace some EU ‘directives’ (which call on member states to transpose
their instructions into national law—akin to ‘cooperative federalism’ in
the US) with EU ‘regulations’ (which are effective throughout the EU
without such transposition—akin to federal pre-emption in the US), in
order to achieve more uniform and hence simpler rules across the
European single market.¹⁷⁴
The best understanding of simplification is that it attempts to modernize a body of law by editing, pruning, organizing, and streamlining
the laws so that they are more clear, understandable, and effective as well
as less burdensome to navigate. It may well be that legal rules in some
countries in Europe (and in the US) are so labyrinthine that businesses
and individuals must incur high costs just to figure out what the law
means. Simplification in the EU is thus reminiscent of the codification
movement in the US led by David Dudley Field in the mid-1800s, and
the effort in the last several decades in some US states and the federal
government to write laws in plain understandable language. This was
one of the goals of the Clinton–Gore ‘National Performance Review’ and
the Presidential Memorandum of 1 June 1998. As simplification moves
beyond consolidation and codification to undertake the repeal of obsolete or superfluous laws, it is also expressing the view that venerable vintage is not a sufficient reason to preserve a law—perhaps best crystallized
by US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr:
‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
¹⁷³ See DG Enterprise and Industry, ‘Better Regulation—Simplification’, 25 October
2005, posted at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/better_regulation/simplification.
htm.
¹⁷⁴ European Commission, Communication of the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: A
Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment’, COM(2005) 535 final
(Brussels, 25 October 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/
better_regulation/simplification.htm.
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it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past’.¹⁷⁵

But in the EU simplification effort there is also an unmistakable bent of,
if not deregulation, then selective excision of obsolete laws. The French
example is telling: after laws enacted in 2003 and 2004 to reduce costs
to businesses and individuals, France is now considering enactment in
2006 of the ‘loi anti-loi’—the so-called ‘anti-law law’ or ‘killer law’, which
can be used to abrogate outdated or meaningless laws. Belgium has a
‘Kafka test’ to identify maddening bureaucratic puzzles. These may be a
good idea—casual observation and a series of World Bank studies¹⁷⁶ both
hint at the possibility that some European law could use some tidying up,
flexibility, and codification (rather than the opaque system of citation by
date of enactment)—but success depends on the criteria for determining
which laws to rescind or revise or reorganize, and who has the power to
make these decisions. At a meeting on Administrative Simplification in
Paris on 9 June 2006, I asked what these criteria might be, and the
response was that laws that ‘have been in disuse for a long time’ (‘en désuétude’) would be deemed obsolete and slated for repeal. This standard
is too vague, inviting biased selective enforcement. And it neglects the
possibility that while some old laws are indeed obsolete, others may be
dormant because they are widely accepted and rarely violated, but the
act of repealing them signals open season to transgress the old norm in
undesirable ways.
The Mandelkern Group emphasized that simplification does not
mean simplistic deregulation:
The Group’s concept of simplification is not to be mistaken with deregulation.
The two concepts cannot be regarded as synonyms. Deregulation simply refers to
the abolition of rules in a certain sector, whereas simplification—a more
¹⁷⁵ Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 469.
Holmes was referring to common law rules, which judges can change. Statutes enacted by
the legislature may be more difficult for judges to reform and may deserve reform programs
or phaseout schedules to enable periodic review and revision or repeal. See Guido Calabresi,
A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983).
¹⁷⁶ World Bank, ‘Doing Business in 2006: Creating Jobs’ (2006), ‘Doing Business
in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth’ (2005), and ‘Doing Business in 2004:
Understanding Regulation’ (2004), all available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
In the 2006 report, in the summary ranking on ‘Ease of Doing Business’, France ranked
44th and Italy 70th, while Denmark, the UK, and Ireland were eighth, ninth, and eleventh.
The top three spots in both 2006 and 2005 were held by New Zealand, Singapore, and the
USA. These reports focus on economic (price and entry) regulation, not on risk (health,
safety and environmental) regulation. There can also be debates about the methodologies
used to compile the rankings.
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advanced stage in governing regulation—is aimed at preserving the existence of
rules in a certain sector, while making them more effective, less burdensome, and
easier to understand and to comply with . . . . Therefore, by simplification we
refer to the process of reform of existing regulation, which seeks to streamline
administrative procedures and to reduce the burden of compliance on citizens,
businesses and the public sector itself, while preserving the intended (political)
goals of the regulation.¹⁷⁷

But sometimes the original intended goals of the legislation also become
obsolete. Changes in economics, technology, and social values may well
call for repeal or replacement of old laws. The key, again, is the criteria for
such choices. Standing alone, the simplification initiative lacks clear
criteria for identifying and modifying laws.
Instead, I suggest applying IA and BCA to decide on the rescission or
revision of existing laws. IA and BCA should be used to evaluate existing
regulations as well as new regulations, and to evaluate deregulation and
simplification as well as new regulatory proposals. Such evenhandedness
would reduce the current new/old bias in regulatory review. It would also
correct the bias toward cutting regulatory costs or repealing old laws without considering benefits. Some existing laws and regulations should be
phased out, and others strengthened, depending on new information and
learning, but this process should be guided by sensible analysis rather
than only by political impulses. More blunt approaches—such as predetermined ‘sunset’ dates at which regulations automatically expire, or
political targets to cut administrative costs by a certain percentage, or
deregulation without BCA, or simplification programs to rescind laws on
the ground that they have not been used recently—are crudely effective
but arbitrary; they neglect the benefits of existing policies and administrative requirements (including costly policies that generate worthwhile
benefits, and laws that have not been used recently because compliance is
universal as long as the law is in effect). Applying BCA criteria to the
review of existing policies would be better: it would put the focus on
benefits as well as costs, and it would enable net benefits to be maximized
by strengthening, revising, weakening, or eliminating these policies, as
the merits warrant.¹⁷⁸
¹⁷⁷ Mandelkern Group Report (2001), n 2 above, at 33.
¹⁷⁸ The Commission appears to be heading in this direction: ‘Simplification is not
merely an exercise in improving accessibility and readability. It is intended to operate
within the Competitiveness policy and for this reason a reinvigorated simplification programme, to be launched in 2006/7, will reinforce the mechanisms for identifying legislation that requires simplification; namely legislation which careful assessment shows to
be disproportionately burdensome for EU citizens and businesses in relation to the public
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One promising tack for simplification programs would be to rescind
perverse subsidies.¹⁷⁹ Governments spend billions of taxpayer dollars (and
euros) on subsidizing agriculture, energy, mining, water use, logging, and
many other industries. Such policies often endure long after their initial
usefulness has ebbed, yet continue to support activities that are both
environmentally harmful and economically wasteful. They are resilient in
part because they are supported by concentrated beneficiary constituencies, and impose diffuse costs on the general tax-paying public who face
free-rider incentives not to complain. To surmount these rent-seeking
pressures in favor of subsidies, the EU and the US could consider setting
up non-political commissions to identify subsidies for rescission (based
on BCA), with the recommendations to take effect unless the relevant
legislature acts to preserve them. Transitions to systems of support payments that are not tied to output could be added to assist dependent communities to wean themselves off subsidies. This approach would be
similar to the US military base closure commission. And it would use the
power of simplification under Better Regulation to address a problem of
enormous domestic and international concern. Such a ‘subsidy-closing
commission’ could not only save costs and the environment in the US
and EU, but also benefit farmers in poor countries, and make progress
in the stalemate over international trade liberalization.

Oversight
All of this analysis and reform will not make Better Regulation succeed if
it does not influence policy decisions. Impact assessment can change
minds, but it can also become merely cosmetic—a ‘relookage’ as they say
in France—if there is no oversight mechanism to ensure that the analysis
is taken into account in decisions. Some mechanism to check, review, and
shape legislation is needed in the EU institutions.
In the US, environmental impact assessment under NEPA has persistently faced the criticism that agencies do the EIA, but merely attach it to
interests that the legislation aims to safeguard. . . . It is only when the assessment of proportionality clearly confirms that public interests might be equally well served by simpler
means that the repeal or modification of the legislation should be considered’. DG
Enterprise and Industry, ‘Better Regulation—Simplification’, 25 October 2005, posted at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/better_regulation/simplification.htm.
¹⁷⁹ See Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, Perverse Subsidies (Washington, DC: Island
Press, 2001); Barton Thompson, n 92 above (suggesting rescission of perverse subsidies in
order to protect biodiversity).
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the decision they would have made anyway. This is despite the availability of judicial review of NEPA law, including the courts’ power to issue
injunctions halting projects. One reason is that judicial review is infrequent enough to be a weak deterrent. Another is that NEPA has been held
by the US Supreme Court to be ‘purely procedural’, a ‘stop and think’ law,
requiring agencies to assess environmental impacts but not imposing
substantive criteria or constraints on the ultimate decision.¹⁸⁰
By contrast, RIA is sometimes criticized as overly influential, binding
agencies too much as they seek to satisfy OIRA’s criteria for BCA; and yet
sometimes criticized as inadequately influential, because only about half
of agency RIAs monetize the benefits and costs. Still, OIRA’s own data
show that net benefits have increased over time in response to the RIA and
BCA requirements.¹⁸¹ Yet there is no judicial review of RIAs (although
courts can and do take note of RIAs in their decisions under other laws,
such as the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act). The reason for even the partial success of the RIA process
is undoubtedly the role of OIRA in reviewing the RIAs and returning
proposed rules when the criteria are not met. OIRA is more successful at
supervising RIA than the courts are at supervising EIA because judicial
review is decentralized and non-expert, whereas centralized executive
branch oversight is expert and potent while helping to obviate judicial
oversight.¹⁸²
In the EU, at least at the European Commission, the Better
Regulation initiative is still in search of an oversight mechanism. The
Mandelkern Group Report suggested several options, including central,
lateral, interinstitutional, and external models.¹⁸³ The crucial criterion
¹⁸⁰ See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, n 64 above. Others have, to be
sure, criticized NEPA and judicial review of the EIS for delaying federal projects. See
Holder, n 67 above. One study found that NEPA impact analyses usually imposed low
costs of delay and did influence agencies to consider and avoid environmental impacts.
Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucvacies Think: The EIS Strategy of Administrative Reform
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1984).
¹⁸¹ See OMBOIRA Annual Report, 2005 n 102 above.
¹⁸² Justice Breyer’s suggestion in Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993), n 25 above, was an
elite expert group that could manage the risk regulation system to avoid the distortions of
interest group politics and heuristic errors. He cited the French Conseil d’Etat as a potential model. Some criticized this proposal as unduly technocratic and insulated from democratic input. That same year, President Clinton issued EO 12866, maintaining OIRA
authority over regulation while expanding its transparency and public accountability.
¹⁸³ The Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 50, considered several options: ‘There
are five main best practice options for effective structures, of which the first is recommended by OECD guidelines:
— A primary unit based at or near the centre of the administration, with or without
a network of satellite units across the main Ministries or Directorates-General;
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is an effective ability to influence decisions. As the Mandelkern Group
wrote:
‘[T]he issue of appropriate structures is an absolutely crucial topic. The success
of efforts on better regulation will ultimately depend on this very issue . . . . Based
on the experience in various administrations there are four main elements that
seem to be essential for the chosen structure to be effective:
— Strong political support. Better regulation programmes need very strong
political support to produce the desired outcome;
— Support from the centre. The best results are often achieved with the Head
of Government personally and/or at least institutionally interested and
involved;
— A horizontal approach. Very clearly, an all-government approach is necessary; sectoral approaches limited to individual Ministries or DirectoratesGeneral will not achieve optimum results and a coherent, horizontal
approach is needed; and
— A strategic approach. Close connection to the strategic planning of the
government/administration is of real benefit.’¹⁸⁴
This body/structure must, by virtue of its qualified staff with a range of expertise,
its specific position in the administration, its recognised authority and its expertise in managing regulatory quality tools, be able to ensure adherence to the
process that contributes towards improving regulatory quality. At the same time
this body/structure must have an appropriate level of autonomy, as well as objectiveness with regard to the policy officials who prepare regulations . . . . the
body/structure might also be given a gate-keeping function.’¹⁸⁵

Yet despite this advice from 2001, and the US model in place since at
least 1981, the European Commission appears still to be searching in 2006
for the best way to handle the oversight question. Constructing an oversight
mechanism is a work in progress. Vice President Verheugen recently declared:
I will be campaigning for three major new initiatives: First, President Barroso and
I will significantly strengthen central oversight in the Commission to police the
— A primary unit based in a part of the administration other than the centre (e.g.
Public Administration or Economic Affairs Ministry), probably with a network
of satellite units;
— An inter-ministerial co-ordination committee;
— A network of units/responsibilities across the main Ministries or DirectoratesGeneral, with or without support from a primary unit; and
— A body external to the administration (a body of such type may especially be
apt to be integrated into the evaluation of the consequences of already existing
regulation)’.
¹⁸⁴ Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 47–8 (emphasis in original).
¹⁸⁵ Ibid at 49.
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quality of our Impact Assessment. While the Impact Assessments must be carried
out by the services responsible for the development of the proposals, we must also
ensure that they are rigorously scrutinised by an ‘independent party’ within the
Commission but with no involvement in the preparation of the file. This is why
as a first step, we are creating a standing committee of senior officials who will be
tasked with ensuring that the Impact Assessments are in full conformity with the
exacting requirements we have set ourselves. These officials should report directly
to the President and myself. In this way we can strengthen the system of checks
and balances in the Commission.¹⁸⁶

Where this independent review will be located is still an open question.
Within the European Commission, the office of the Secretariat General
has the authority to perform this function, but does not yet have the
expert staff to review IAs, and has not yet issued an ‘avis negatif ’ based on
an IA. Perhaps it will soon bolster its capacity. Other options for a central
oversight body include the Bureau of European Policy Advisors attached
to the Presidency; a new Presidential office; or a shared group of DGs or
an interinstitutional body linking several units such as DG Enterprise,
DG EcoFin, DG Environment, DG SANCO, the Legal Service, and
others with expert staff.
But none of these has yet been adopted at the EU level.¹⁸⁷ The structure of power in the Commission to some extent inhibits a strong central
role, because the President of the Commission is not popularly elected
and remains one member of the College of Commissioners, all of whom
are appointed at the same time and are expected to work together.
Moreover, the objective of the European Union is in substantial part to
prevent conflicts among the countries of Europe, and as a result the collegial and courteous style of work within the Commission seems, at least to
an outsider accustomed to the tough debates within the White House
‘family’, to be unreceptive to the sharp and hierarchical confrontations
over policies that central regulatory oversight might entail. The question
is whether a Commission could decide collegially to establish an oversight
office with real power, an office that would sometimes oppose the position of one or another individual Commissioner, or whether instead
such a reform must await more radical governance reform such as the
advent of a popularly elected European President who could install such
an office.
¹⁸⁶ Günter Verheugen, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for
Enterprise and Industry, Better Regulation for Jobs and Growth, Former Members
Dinner, European Parliament Former Members Association, Brussels, 10 May 2006,
SPEECH/06/287, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/verheugen/
speeches/speeches_en.htm.
¹⁸⁷ Several have been tried at the member state level. See Hahn and Litan, n 18 above.
The UK has a central expert body in its Better Regulation Executive. Finland assigns the
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Meanwhile, filling the open niche, DG Enterprise has developed
substantial staff expertise and appears to be acting, in effect, as the ‘lateral’
oversight arm. If so, this is progress, but it is not yet the ideal. Lateral oversight offers staff capacity, but typically lacks the power to enforce supervisory decisions on other co-equal units. And lateral oversight lacks the
perspective and legitimacy of central oversight. Even if DG Enterprise
does a very fine job, its lateral posture will yield the appearance (if not the
reality) of factionalized or parochial review, if it appears to represent
the interests of business rather than of full social impacts, in turn raising
questions about its credibility and hence its sustainability.¹⁸⁸ The review
function (including staff with expertise) should thus be relocated to the
center, that is, to the Presidency of the Commission. DG Enterprise
could continue its review activities in support of this central office, or
the current review team at DG Enterprise could (along with others) be
promoted to become the staff of the central office.¹⁸⁹
This central oversight office should not be just a referee, nor simply a
check on regulation percolating up from the DGs. That is too reactive a
posture. The central oversight office should be closely attached to the
Presidency of the Commission and should carry out the President’s strategy for regulatory policy (such as Better Regulation using IA).¹⁹⁰ Of
course the Commission President could lead this initiative along with one
of the Vice Presidents (just as the US Executive Orders originally designated the Vice President to oversee OMB/OIRA, a role now transferred
to the White House Chief of Staff by EO 13258). In addition to waiting
oversight role to its Trade Ministry, and Hungary to its Justice Ministry. Recently, France
shifted its Better Regulation office from the office of Réforme de l’Etat, attached to the
Prime Minister, to the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Industry. Although this creates
a lateral review rather than a central office, its objective was to combine regulatory review
with fiscal budgetary review in the Finance Ministry and thereby to add effective teeth to
the review function.
¹⁸⁸ Radaelli, n 27 above, at 940, argues that ‘credibility is the Achilles heel of impact
assessment. [If ] RIA is tilted towards one actor’s preferences to the detriment of others,
there is no economic analysis that can compensate for the credibility deficit’.
¹⁸⁹ I emphasize that I am not criticizing the individuals at DG Enterprise, nor the
quality of their work; they are filling a niche left open and a role that the Better Regulation
initiative demands be filled, and by all accounts are doing so quite ably. The point here is
about institutional structure.
¹⁹⁰ See Kagan, n 17 above, (‘We live today in an era of Presidential administration . . .
presidential control of administration, in critical respects, expanded dramatically during
the Clinton years, making the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more
and more an extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda’); James
F Blumstein, ‘Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President’ (2001) 51 Duke
LJ 851. For doubts whether the Presidential agenda and expert BCA can fully coexist in
regulatory review, see Stuart Shapiro, ‘Politics and Regulatory Policy Analysis’, (summer
2006) Regulation magazine 40–5.
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for regulatory proposals to arrive from the DGs for review, the central
oversight office should play an early role in shaping the regulatory priorities of the Commission, working with DGs to identify subjects warranting regulation, to improve their policy proposals, to reconcile tradeoffs,
and to ensure best practices across DGs. It should issue ‘prompt’ letters to
stimulate new regulation that its expert analysis deems desirable, and
‘return’ letters (or avis negatifs) to reject regulations where the analysis is
inadequate.
In the EU system the Commission initiates new legislation, so IA
within the Commission is important, especially at a central oversight
office that can reconcile competing interests across the DGs. Otherwise
the lead DG may simply carry the day, or there may be horse trading
among DGs (among Commissioners) in which each gets its priority
initiatives adopted but none is truly assessed for overall net benefit to
the EU.
‘Complicated regulation arises in large part from current practice of the
Commission, by which regulation is drafted primarily by more than 20
Directorates-General, with an imperfect degree of co-ordination among them.
This does not optimise collegiate action and often forsakes the benefits that could
be gained by a more deliberative form of decision-making. On this crucial topic,
it has been widely observed that different DGs draw up draft directives in themselves perfectly compatible with the objectives and administrative culture of a
particular DG, but compatibility with general EU interests is weakly ensured.’¹⁹¹

Central oversight of the IA process in the Commission would thus be
important to ensure that EU-wide net benefits are considered in important regulatory policies.
Even if the Commission does establish centralized review, there may
also be a need for an external check on the Commission because of the
Commission’s monopoly on initiating legislation. This external check
could be situated in the Council, the Parliament, or an Interinstitutional
body.
The Council is currently ill-suited to this task because the Council
members who meet on a particular matter, although ostensibly representing each member state’s prime minister or government, in fact tend to
be the ministers from the single ministry concerned with the specific issue
of the legislation (eg all the Environment ministers), and therefore tend
to support the legislation. ‘At the European level, even if the proposals
have to come from the Commission, which, operating in collegiate fashion, seeks to weigh the various demands and interests, the competent
¹⁹¹ Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 64.
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Council is composed of just the sectoral ministers, who are in charge of
the final decision. This asymmetry leads to a systematic tendency towards
the growth of regulation.’¹⁹² The Council’s role in IA could be strengthened if the member states insisted on a full consideration of impacts
before deciding on instructions for their delegates to the Council, and,
furthermore, if the member states conducted their own IAs. There is now
talk of member state parliaments doing so in order to assess EU directives
before they are adopted and must be transposed into member state law.
The Council’s role in EU-level Better Regulation could be best supported
if the member states created a network or pool of member state experts
(drawn from each member state’s own central regulatory oversight
office)—the Council’s own ‘regulatory analysis review group’, to borrow
the title of President Carter’s interagency body—available to conduct IAs
for the Council and to deliberate together on regulatory proposals. The
Commission’s Communication of 16 March 2005, at 10, announces a
‘group of high-level national regulatory experts’, although this group may
or may not be in a position to advise the Council.
Apart from the Council, external oversight would be left to the
European Courts or the European Parliament. The Courts are not
equipped with the staff or expertise to perform IA, and they tend to defer
to the Commission and the Council (as in the Pfizer case discussed
above). But if the other EU institutions do not effectively oversee regulatory policy, the courts may step in. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has the motivation to check legislative initiatives coming from the
Commission, but so far does not have the political clout. In the US, the
adoption of the Congressional Review Act in 1996 authorized a special
procedure for Congress to reject an agency regulation (a power Congress
always had via legislation, so long as the President did not veto the law or
Congress could override the veto), but Congress did not create an expert
body to conduct IA, so exercise of the CRA remains an essentially political act. And it remains rare—of almost 42,000 rules including 610 major
rules promulgated in the last ten years, the Congressional Review Act has
only been used to reject one: the ergonomics rule rescinded in March
2001.¹⁹³ Adding an expert body equipped to perform IA in the US
Congress and in the European Parliament (as a counterpart to IA by the
¹⁹² Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 64.
¹⁹³ Statement of Morton Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service, before the House
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary,
Concerning Oversight of the Congressional Review Act on the Tenth Anniversary of its
Enactment, 30 March 2006, http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/rosenberg033006.
pdf, at 3.
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White House and the Commission) could raise the Parliament’s stature
and enable it to engage actively in reasoned debate over regulatory policy
(to reject, revise, or prompt policies, as the net benefits warrant). In the US,
such a body could also, perhaps even more importantly, enable IA of legislative proposals in Congress, which currently are not subject to IA. But if
no such expert IA body is created, then Congressional or Parliamentary
review of regulatory policy could be seriously dysfunctional: driven by
the vicissitudes of political winds and caprice, unrelated to societal net
benefits, it could mark a return to horse trading among parties and
parochialisms that would harm rather than help yield Better Regulation.
In sum, a central oversight office is needed in the EU regulatory system, but the unique features of EU governance imply that ‘centralized’
could be within the Commission (overseeing the DGs), at the Council
(with support from the member states), at the Parliament, or in a new
interinstitutional body. This oversight office needs the capacity to conduct excellent analysis, embracing the broad set of topics outlined above,
with skills not only in economics but in other fields as well, including the
science underlying benefits estimates and risk assessments. It needs the
power to influence decisions: to say no (return), yes (prompt), or revise. It
needs to follow clear procedures of transparency, posting its meetings and
decisions for public view, to avoid the appearance of backroom deals.¹⁹⁴
And it needs the expertise not only to evaluate regulatory proposals
and IAs, but also to assist the DGs with their policy development and
analyses:
Education as to the usefulness of the tool in assisting the policy process is vital—
policy officials need to see what is ‘in it for them’ in using the system. But there
must also be a credible deterrent element—if the process is not completed
properly (timing and quality), the progress of the policy can be delayed, halted
completely or challenged subsequently.¹⁹⁵

At present, the most likely candidate for such a central oversight office is
within the Commission, either in the Secretariat General or in a new
body attached to the Presidency (and a Vice President). The Commission’s
Competitiveness Council might play this role, if it were equipped with an
expert staff and if it took a full-portfolio view of overall impacts rather
than focusing only on competitiveness. But over time the creation of oversight mechanisms in the Council and the Parliament could supplement
and check the Commission’s oversight role. A new interinstitutional body
¹⁹⁴ This was a key improvement made in EO 12866 in 1993, and redoubled by OIRA
after 2000 when it posted all its activities on a public website at www.omb.gov.
¹⁹⁵ Mandelkern Group Report (2001), at 24.
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remains the least well-defined option; it would be the most ‘central’ but
perhaps the least potent. Failing all these options, the courts may begin to
take a tougher role in reviewing EU regulatory policies.

Ex Post Evaluation and Adaptive Management
Do policies actually work? With what results? This question is often
neglected, perhaps because agencies have scarce resources which they prefer to devote to new initiatives. Most wealthy countries currently conduct
some kind of ex ante assessment through IA, but few conduct ex post
review. In the US, EO 12866 requires ex ante review of major rules but
does not require ex post evaluation.
One reason to conduct ex post evaluation is to improve policies over
time based on the updated information about effectiveness, benefits,
costs, and unintended countervailing or ancillary effects.¹⁹⁶ The use of
performance monitoring data to revise policies is often called ‘adaptive
management’. A second reason to conduct ex post evaluations is to determine how accurate the ex ante RIA estimates were, and to validate and
improve the ex ante methodologies for subsequent decision-making. As
noted above, initial retrospective studies by OMB and by Harrington
et al,¹⁹⁷ while not representative samples, find both over- and underestimates in the ex ante analyses.¹⁹⁸
¹⁹⁶ Charles Herrick and Daniel Sarewitz, ‘Ex Post Evaluation: A More Effective Role
for Scientific Assessments in Environmental Policy’, (2000) 25 Science, Technology, and
Human Values 309–31.
¹⁹⁷ See OMB, n 102 above; Harrington et al, n 102 above. An early call for such evaluations was W Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1983), 162–3 (criticizing the absence of ex
post evaluation of cost estimates, and urging creation of a staff group to conduct these
analyses).
¹⁹⁸ Ex post evaluations face methodological challenges. See James K Hammitt, ‘Risk
Assessment and Economic Evaluation’, ch 112 in William N. Rom (ed), Environmental
and Occupational Medicine (4th edn) (Philadelphia: Lippincott-Raven, 2006), 33–6 (noting that ‘retrospective values are also estimates because, although one can observe some of
the consequences once the rule is implemented, one cannot observe what the consequences
would be if the rule had not been adopted and so the counterfactual situation must be estimated. In addition, the health benefits of a regulation may remain quite uncertain in cases
where the individuals suffering the health effects due to the agent that is regulated may not
be identifiable’). One should not draw the conclusion from ex post evaluations that ex ante
predictions can always be easily improved. Ex post evaluations may yield ‘hindsight bias’—
the misimpression that outcomes were more easily predicted ex ante when in fact they were
difficult to predict ex ante. Terrorist attacks and corporate fraud may look predictable in
hindsight when ex ante clues are turned up, but those ex ante clues may have been buried
among many other clues pointing in other directions. See Scott A. Hawkins and Reid
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As it implements Better Regulation, the EU and its member states
should take the opportunity to build in regular ex post evaluations of policies and of ex ante IAs. In the future, ex post evaluation exercises should
address a representative sample of past IAs rather than a convenience
sample. They should quantify the degree of error rather than just whether
the ex ante IA over- or underestimated. They should address countervailing risks and ancillary benefits (both those forecast ex ante and those
observed ex post). Eventually, ex post evaluations should be undertaken as
a routine matter for every major rulemaking, both to improve ex ante
methods and to revise policies through adaptive management.
Some observers urge more ex post evaluation and adaptive revision, and
less reliance on ex ante evaluation via BCA.¹⁹⁹ But why not do both? One
cannot just do ex post analysis alone—because one needs some way to
choose which policies to adopt at first, and then review later. One still
needs some sensible criteria for initial choices.²⁰⁰
The adaptive management aspect of ex post review corresponds to the
‘provisional’ character of precautionary regulation, meant to be updated
as science evolves. But this still leaves open the question of who will conduct the additional research and who will apply that research to ex post
policy evaluation and revision. JB Ruhl worries that ‘decisionmakers need
to be in a position to adjust decisions based on reliable monitoring feedback [and] in a manner that is transparent and accountable [and] subject
to some objective boundaries’, but in practice this gets bogged down by
interest groups and judicial review; it ‘cannot flourish . . . in the conventional [US] administrative law context’, so we need ‘new institutions . . .
that allow agencies to use adaptive management while ensuring adequate
agency accountability’.²⁰¹ Ex post review using BCA could serve this role.
Hastie, ‘Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events after the Outcomes are Known’,
(1990) 107 Psychol Bull 311, 312; Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J Rachlinski, and Donald C
Langevoort, ‘Fraud by Hindsight’, (2004) 98 Northwestern University Law Review 773.
¹⁹⁹ Sidney A Shapiro and Robert L Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a
Pragmatic Approach (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003).
²⁰⁰ Cf Ackerman et al, n 96 above (arguing that BCA mistakenly skews decisions
against environmental protection, as illustrated by the authors’ ex post reconstructions of
ex ante BCA rejecting selected past decisions that they contend were good). But on what
criteria do they determine that the initial decisions were good? If ex post BCA shows that
the decisions were good but ex ante BCA would not have done so, this is the kind of ex post
review that can be used to improve the methods of ex ante BCA. A more complete sample
would also include cases where BCA did favor adoption of the policy ex ante but would not
ex post, and cases where BCA would have favored adoption of the policy ex ante but was not
used and hence the policy was not adopted.
²⁰¹ See J B Ruhl, ‘Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is it Possible?’ (2005) 7 Minn
J Law, Sci & Tech 21, 53–5.
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And perhaps Europe, with a less ossified system of judicial review, could
do better at this task than the US.
Such ex post evaluation should also apply to the choice among regulatory instruments. There is ample theory on the different costs and effectiveness of technology standards, emissions trading, taxes, information
disclosure instruments, environmental contracts, and other instrument
options. But there is insufficient empirical evidence on how these tools
operate in practice. Ex post evaluation of these interventions could go a
long way to improving future policy choices.²⁰²
The move toward regular ex post evaluations of regulations has been
slow, but recent activity is promising. US EPA only began to conduct
ex post evaluations in the late 1990s,²⁰³ including a major retrospective
study of the Clean Air Act required by Congress.²⁰⁴ US OMB/OIRA
is now beginning to conduct ex post evaluations of agency RIAs, as
noted above.²⁰⁵ The OECD held a meeting on ex post evaluations in
²⁰² One recent effort is Winston Harrington, Richard Morgenstern, and Thomas
Sterner (eds), Choosing Environmental Policy (Washington, DC: RFF Press, 2004), collecting ex post studies of the impacts of technology-based and incentive-based environmental
policies in the US and Europe.
²⁰³ According to a GAO report, of the more than 100 major rules issued by EPA from
1981 to 1998, only five were subject to ex post evaluations, with all of those five reviews
occurring after 1997. GAO, ‘Environmental Protection: Assessing the Impacts of EPA’s
Regulations through Retrospective Studies’, GAO/RCED-99–250 (September 1999).
GAO concluded: ‘While EPA devotes substantial resources to cost-benefit analyses when
developing new regulations, the agency seldom looks back at the actual costs and benefits
after those regulations have been implemented’. Ibid at 13. GAO recommended that EPA
develop a plan for systematic ex post evaluations, ibid at 14. See also Thomas O McGarity
and Ruth Ruttenberg, ‘Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulation’ (2002) 80 Tex L Rev 1997 (criticizing ex ante cost estimates and the lack of ex
post evaluation).
²⁰⁴ US EPA, ‘The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970–1990, Section 812
Retrospective Study’ (October 1997).
²⁰⁵ OMB, n 102 above. Scholars’ ex post evaluations of BCA include Harrington et al,
n 102 above; James K Hammitt, ‘Are the Costs of Proposed Environmental Regulations
Overestimated? Evidence from the CFC Phaseout’ (2000) 16 Envtl & Resource Econ
281–301; P W Kolp and W Kip Viscusi, ‘Uncertainty in Risk Analysis: A Retrospective
Assessment of the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard’ (1986) 4 Advances in Applied
Microeconomics 105–30. For more general reviews of OIRA’s influence on regulatory policy
(as opposed to ex post validation of BCAs), see eg OMB/OIRA Annual Report 2005,
n 102 above (finding that OIRA ex ante reviews have yielded rules promising substantial
net benefits); Steven Croley, ‘White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation’ (2003) 70 U Chicago Law Review 821 (finding that OIRA has had a discernible and beneficial influence on rules, with little evidence of bias); Hahn and Muething,
n 60 above (finding fully monetized BCA in about half of US agencies’ RIAs); Scott Farrow,
‘Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Oversight Matter?’ (draft July 2000,
available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id123) (finding little impact on rejections of rules); Stuart Shapiro, ‘Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations’ (2005) 35 Envtl L Rep 10433 (arguing that
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2003.²⁰⁶ The European Environment Agency has attempted to conduct ex post analyses (of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, though
not necessarily of BCA), but has been hampered by lack of comparable
information across member states.²⁰⁷ To address that need, the EU IA
Guidelines now direct attention to planning for ex post review in the
initial policy design and ex ante IA.²⁰⁸
The lesson for Better Regulation is to learn from medicine: Treat the
whole patient, not just one ailment at a time, and measure success by
‘evidence-based’ ex post review or ‘outcomes studies’ of patients after
treatment.²⁰⁹ Better Regulation should develop large-scale outcomes
studies to track the effects of regulatory policy choices over time, and
across jurisdictions (where policies vary spatially). These ex post outcomes
studies could be conducted by regulatory agencies and oversight offices,
but could also be delegated to an independent body to ensure greater
objectivity. In this effort, the US and EU could collaborate on a transatlantic policy laboratory—a joint effort in the ex post epidemiology of
regulatory interventions and their empirical impacts.

Conclusions
In many respects, the Better Regulation initiative promises salutary
reforms, such as wider use of regulatory impact assessments (IAs) to evaluate regulatory decisions ex ante. In other respects, including some of its
BCA has had little effect on rulemaking because OIRA has put more emphasis on coordinating Presidential priorities); Bagley and Revesz, n 107 above (arguing that BCA has had a
significant impact on rulemaking, but that OIRA should instead put more emphasis on
coordinating Presidential priorities); Richard D Morgenstern (ed), Economic Analysis at
EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Washington, DC: RFF Press, 1997) (finding beneficial
impact). A challenge in these studies is to identify the counterfactual baseline of what would
have happened absent regulatory review. See Cary Coglianese, ‘Empirical Analysis and
Administrative Law’, (2002) Univ Illinois L Rev 1111.
²⁰⁶ OECD, Regulatory Performance: Ex Post Evaluation of Regulatory Policies (Paris,
22 September 2003) (noting at p 5 the increasing interest in evidence-based empirical
evaluation of policy impacts).
²⁰⁷ European Environment Agency (EEA), ‘Reporting on Environmental Measures: Are
We Being Effective?’ Environmental Issues Report no. 25 (November 2001) (calling for
greater attention to data collection and comparability to enable ex post evaluations); EEA,
‘Effectiveness of Packaging Waste Management Systems in Selected Countries: An EEA
Pilot Study’, Report 3/2005 (2005) (noting at p 8 that ‘The sixth environment action programme of the European Community (6EAP) highlights the need to undertake “ex-post
evaluation of the effectiveness of existing measures in meeting their environmental objectives”,’ but finding such analysis inhibited by non-comparable data across member states).
²⁰⁸ IA Guidelines 2006, at 44–6.
²⁰⁹ See Wiener, n 151 above (advocating evidence-based outcomes studies for risk regulation, as in medical care). See also Cary Coglianese and Lori Snyder Bennear, ‘Measuring
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rhetoric, its focus on administrative costs and simplification, and its institutional structure, the EU initiative speaks more of deregulation than of
better regulation. Questions also remain whether particular regulatory
programs, such as those regarding genetically modified foods and chemicals (REACH), can be reconciled with the tenets of Better Regulation.
Truly better regulation—maximizing societal well-being—would
involve reducing or eliminating some regulations, but strengthening or
expanding others, depending on the full social consequences of each
choice. Better Regulation will often mean cutting costs. But it will also
sometimes mean more regulation, or more comprehensive regulation: of
issues that BCA shows warrant more regulation; of risks understated by
risk assessment; of multiple simultaneous risks; of countervailing risks
induced by intervention to reduce a target risk; and of risks addressed
through more cost-effective instruments that reduce costs and hence
make the optimal degree of regulation more protective. The ‘less versus
more’ dichotomy is fairly unhelpful in making regulatory policy choices.
‘Better’ can be neither less nor more.
The EU is borrowing the concepts of Better Regulation from US regulatory reform and from initiatives in the EU member states, but Europe
can make Better Regulation even better. Regulatory tools and institutions
can be improved based on learning from past approaches, and tailored to
suit European governance. The problems with impact assessment and
benefit-cost analysis to date appear to be institutional: not that they are
used too much, but rather too little and too narrowly or one-sidedly. IA
and BCA in Europe would be more successful and credible if they were
expanded to become self-reflective proportionate Warm Analysis of full
portfolio impacts, to say yes to the good as well as no to the bad, to apply
to a wider array of public policies (such as trade and counterterrorism)
beyond the current focus on risk regulation, to embrace multiple countervailing risks and ancillary benefits, and to guide administrative simplification to consider benefits as well as costs. In addition, Europe should
establish a centralized expert oversight body with the authority to use IA
to influence decisions, and a system of ex post policy evaluations for adaptive revision and for improvement of ex ante assessment methods. These
reforms would help Better Regulation become even better and achieve its
true objective: better, not less or more.
Progress: Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies’ (2005) 47(2) Environment magazine 22–40 (lamenting lack of ex post evaluation and advocating establishment of systematic program evaluation to measure policies’ actual impacts); Cary Coglianese and Lori
Snyder Bennear, ‘Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based
Decision Making’, in Social and Behavioral Science Research Priorities For Environmental
Decision Making (Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academies
Press, 2005) 246–73.
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Europe should experiment with these institutional innovations under
its Better Regulation strategies, and evaluate their performance over time.
Europe has an opportunity to develop new and improved approaches
to regulation, not only borrowing but also adapting and creating anew.
The innovations suggested here can help Europe manage its regulatory
system, facilitate trade in the Single European Market, and advance
European competitiveness, while ensuring that Better Regulation really
means better. In turn, the US could improve its own regulatory regime by
monitoring and borrowing from Europe’s successes.
The exercise of legal borrowing involved in Better Regulation, and the
normative evaluation of that borrowing that I have offered, show that—
at least in this case—the focus is, and should be, on the particular merits
of legal ideas, not on abstract ideology or supposedly fixed national legal
mentalities. Blake overstated the case: ‘To generalize is to be an idiot. To
particularize is alone the distinction of merit.’²¹⁰ That itself is a hasty
generalization, perhaps unintentionally proving its point, because some
generalizations are useful.²¹¹ But the point remains that particularization
adds insight; the details matter, even when they are difficult to grasp.
Observed La Rochefoucauld: ‘Pour bien savoir les choses, il en faut savoir
le détail, et comme il est presque infini, nos connaissances sont toujours
superficielles et imparfaites.’²¹² Better Regulation itself consists in large
measure of knowing the important details, without seeking perfection in
every last detail, and in using those details to offer and to test different
reasons for alternative regulatory choices, toward a considered judgment
about the better course of action. Mr Franklin’s advice to avoid ‘rash steps’
by a prudential evaluation of the consequences now finds fruition in
what Mr Blair has called ‘regulation after reflection’.
²¹⁰ William Blake, Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds’ Discourses (1814).
²¹¹ For a provocative discussion, see Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser,
‘Regulation by Generalization’, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Working Paper 05–16,
August 2005.
²¹² La Rochefoucauld, Maximes (Montreal: Les Editions Variétés, 1946), no 106 (p 61)
(translated into English, ‘To know things well, one must know the details, but as these are
almost infinite, our understanding is always superficial and imperfect.’).

